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This Note focuses on the accountability of corporations for indirectly fueling civil wars by
purchasing diamonds from insurgent groups. While many corporations are involved in the di-
amond industry, De Beers controls a majority of the uncut diamond market, including mining,
buying, and selling uncut diamonds. Therefore, this Note will analyze whether De Beers may be
held liable for knowingly funding war criminals under the Alien Tort Claims Act (”ATCA”). Part
I of this Note examines the trade in conflict diamonds in Angola and Sierra Leone and De Beers’s
involvement in this trade. Part II examines case law developments under the ATCA and obstacles
to recovery against multinational corporations (”MNCs”) under the ATCA. Part II also outlines
efforts made by international organizations, the U.S. government, and MNCs to regulate the ac-
tivities of MNCs in host countries. Part III argues that De Beers should be liable under the ATCA
for complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity by funding insurgent groups engaged
in human rights violations. This Note concludes that the ATCA should be amended and offers a
proposal for legislation to make MNCs liable for their involvement in human rights abuses. Under
an amended ATCA, De Beers could be held accountable for its part in the conflict diamond trade.
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The insurgents1 broke through the gate to Alpha's house in
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone.' They had cuts on their
faces covered with adhesive strips.3 The insurgents put cocaine
* In loving memory of George V. Comfort. Much appreciation to Professor
Chantal Thomas for her feedback on this Note, and to my family and friends for their
support and patience during many long lectures on conflict diamonds.
1. See David Wippman, Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Inter-
vention in Internal Conflict, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. J. 435, 441 (1997) (explaining differ-
ence between rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency). An insurgency exists when op-
position to the legitimate government extends beyond riots to circumstances where the
uprising is of serious proportion, organized with leaders, and offers a time effective
resistance to legitimate government. See ANN V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., NON-
INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 216-17 (1956) (defining in-
surgency and characteristics associated with such circumstances). The conflict in Sierra
Leone can be characterized as an insurgency because the opposition group has an or-
ganized structure and it has persisted for ten years. See Wippman, supra, at 441 (ex-
plaining characteristics of insurgency); JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 31, 36-40, 44-45, 58-59, 87 (2001) (reporting that Foday
Sankoh is leader of Sierra Leone insurgents called Revolutionary United Front ("RUF")
that fought throughout 1990s and boycotted efforts to hold democratic elections); see
also Steve Coll, The Other War: The Gratuitous Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone Last
Year Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the Same Time, WASH. POST MA.,Jan. 9, 2000, at
W8, W9 (explaining that RUF is insurgent army in Sierra Leone). The civil war in
Sierra Leone began when the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") rebelled against the
government in 1991. See HIRSCH, supra, at 31 (commenting that civil war has ensued for
most of decade following rebellion in 1991); EARL CONTEH-MORGAN & MAC DIxON-FYLE,
SIERRA LEONE AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY- HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
126-27 (1999) (noting that RUF attacked territory in Sierra Leone in 1991); David Orr,
A Nation Sinks into Savagery: Racked by a Five-Year Civil War, Sierra Leone is Now the Scene of
New, Barely Imaginable Outrages, INDEPENDENT (London), May 5, 1999, at 14 (asserting
that RUF attacks began in 1991); Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with
Murder, Mutilation, Rape: Background, July 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/re-
ports/ 1999/sierra/SIERLE99-02.htm#P142_28430 [hereinafter HRW-Sierra Leone: Back-
ground] (maintaining that RUF rebelled in 1991, attempting to overthrow Sierra Leone
government).
2. See Coil, supra note 1, at W9 (reporting RUF invasion of Freetown).
3. See id. at W9 (claiming that adhesive strips covered incisions where soldiers in-
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into their bloodstreams through these incisions.4 They entered
Alpha's house and demanded money from his parents.5 Alpha's
father handed over all the money he had in his possession.6 The
fighters then abducted Alpha and his two younger brothers,
along with many other young people in the area.7 They took
their captives up a nearby hill where a young combatant named
Tommy chopped off the captives' arms with an axe.8 Alpha and
his brother, Amadu, survived the amputations and were taken in
by a family that cared for them.9 Alpha later found out that his
other brother, Dawda, died from loss of blood and that the in-
surgents burned his parents and sister alive in their house. 10
This incident stands as one of many in an ongoing civil con-
flict in Sierra Leone. 1 Experts claim that political ideologies do
serted cocaine into their bloodstream); Douglas Farah, Children Forced to Kill; Sierra Le-
one's Ex-Fighters Try to Recover Stolen Youth, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2000, at Al (claiming that
cocaine and gunpowder was put into cuts on child soldiers faces).
4. See Coll, supra note 1, at W9 (asserting that insurgents use various drugs to get
high before going into battle); Michael Dynes, West Side Boys are Jungle Brigands, TIMES
(London), Aug. 28, 2000, at 4 (maintaining that young fighters were given cocaine and
alcohol to make killing easier); Douglas Farah, Rebel Leader Captured: Sankoh's Arrest
Sparks Jubilation in Sierra Leone's Capital, WASH. POST, May 18, 2000, at Al (reporting that
Sierra Leone insurgents used children high on cocaine as fighters); Janine di Giovanni,
Girl's Seven Years as Slave of Rebel Forces, TIMES (London), May 13, 2000, at 4 (telling story
of teenage RUF girl soldier who regularly used drugs to prepare herself to kill others).
5. Coll, supra note 1, at W10.
6. Id.
7. See id. (reporting that children were forced into line and taken to nearby
schoolyard).
8. See id. (stating that Alpha's neighbor was first to lose his arm and Alpha's
younger brother was next); see also Sam Kiley, In the Heart of Darkness, TIMEs 2 (London),
May 10, 2000, at 6, 7 (stating that insurgents would ask their victims if they wanted "long
sleeve or short sleeve" before cutting off their arms); Barbara Crossette, In West Africa, a
Grisly Extension of Rebel Terror, N.Y. TiMEs, July 30, 1998, at Al (claiming that insurgents
began amputating civilians' hands so that they would not be able to vote).
9. See Coll, supra note 1, at W24 (reporting that Alpha and his brother requested
poison in order to commit suicide but family refused).
10. See id. (claiming that Alpha's half brother found Alpha and his brother and
told them fate of other family members).
11. See, e.g., Giovanni, supra note 4, at 4 (describing 11 year old girl abducted by
insurgents in Sierra Leone and forced to be combatant and sexual slave for seven
years); Jeremy Vine, The Victims of Sierra Leone's Rebels, Mar. 18, 1999, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_298000/298754.stm (reporting story
of ten year old and eight year old girls who lost their arms to insurgents in Sierra Le-
one); Sierra Leone Peace Deal Signed, July 7, 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/africa/newsid_388000/388153.stm (claiming that 100,000 people have been vic-
tims of mutilation in Sierra Leone conflict); Conflict Diamonds: Americans Can Stop the
Damage They Do, STAR TiuB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),June 12, 2000, at 1OA (telling story of
small child whose arm was cut off by Sierra Leone insurgents).
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not motivate this insurgent group. 12 Instead, they argue that
control of diamond production is a root cause behind the war in
Sierra Leone. '3
Observers note that in several African nations insurgent
groups use diamonds to fund civil wars) 4 The revenue that in-
12. See Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (asserting that insurgents in Sierra Leone
have no political platform); Corinna Schuler, A Rebel Leader of Rag-Tag Terrorists, CHIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 17, 1999, at 7 (maintaining that Sierra Leone insurgents took
up arms before developing political agenda); Phillip Van Niekerk, Africa's Diamond Dogs
of War, OBSERVER, Aug. 13, 1995, at 19 (claiming that leader of Sierra Leone insurgents
represents no political ideology); 60 Minutes: Diamonds (CBS television broadcast, Feb.
18, 2001) [hereinafter 60 Minutes] (noting Bob Simon asserting that rebellion in Sierra
Leone has no political underpinnings).
13. See Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra
Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat, in AFRICAN GUERRILLAS, at 172, 192 (Christopher
Claphem ed., 1998) (alleging that war in Sierra Leone continues because diamond
trade is profitable for insurgents); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 25 (maintaining that dia-
mond trade is major cause of conflict in Sierra Leone and other African nations); Lan-
sana Gberie, Fighting for Peace: Sierra Leone, U.N. CHRON., June 22, 2000, at 51, available
at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/200O/issue2/O2OOp51.htm (maintaining that
war in Sierra Leone is about greed for diamonds not politics); Justin Brown, Why Africa's
Wars Confound Us, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, May 17, 2000, at 3 (claiming that conflict in
Sierra Leone is effort to attain wealth and power through mining diamonds); Ed
O'Loughlin, Sierra Leone Ceasefire May Signal End to Nine-Year Civil War, INDEPENDENT
(London), Nov. 12, 2000, at 25 (claiming that control of diamonds is primary motiva-
tion behind insurgent movement in Sierra Leone); Diamonds Are Sierra Leone War's Best
Friend, May 24, 2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/05/24/si-
erra.leone/index.html [hereinafter War's Best Fiend] (asserting that war in Sierra Le-
one will not end until insurgents are forced out of diamond mining areas); Conciliation
Resources, Resources, Primary Industry, and Conflict in Sierra Leone, Sept./Oct. 1997, at
http://www.c-r.org/occ-papers/briefing3.htm (maintaining that diamonds are crucial
to power in Sierra Leone and present chaos is conducive to control of diamond mining
by insurgents). See generally Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Impli-
cations for Policy, June 15, 2000, available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/con-
flict/papers/civilconflict.htm (asserting that civil wars will persist where insurgent
groups have financial incentive to continue fighting). Commentators also assert that
the civil war in Angola revolves around controlling diamond production. See Bob
Drogin, Rebels, Soldiers and Freelancers Rush to Dig Up an Incomparable Treasure, Straining a
Fragile Truce, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at Al (maintaining that war in Angola is about
control of diamond-producing areas); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANGOLA: ARMs TRADE
AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAws OF WAR SINCE THE 1992 ELECTIONS 57 (1994) [hereinafter
HRW-ANGOLA] (claiming that Angolan insurgent groups use diamonds to procure
arms). But see African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 69 (2000) (statement of J.F. 'Jack"Jolis, President, Rough
Diamond Consultancy) (asserting that civil wars in Africa would continue even without
diamonds).
14. See VICTORIA BRITrAIN, DEATH OF DIGNITY 67, 74 (1998) (asserting that Angolan
insurgents captured diamond mines and used diamonds to buy arms); HIRSCH, supra
note 1, at 25 (maintaining that insurgents in Sierra Leone and Liberia use diamonds to
sustain war effort); Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 183 (claiming that insurgents
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surgents obtain from smuggling diamonds across borders allows
them to buy more arms and to continue fighting. 15 The fighting
in Sierra Leone obtained some arms through sale of smuggled diamonds across Sierra
Leone's borders); Lynne Duke, Angola s Chaos Liberates Forces of Corruption, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 1999, at A27 (claiming that Angolan insurgent forces use diamonds to finance
fighting); Blaine Harden, Africa's Diamond Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at Al (assert-
ing that Angolan insurgents paid for offensive with diamond money); David Buchan et
al., The Deadly Scramble for Diamonds in Africa, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at 6 (maintaining
that insurgents in Sierra Leone use diamonds to pay for on-going civil war); Minh T.
Vo, A Conflict Rooted in Rebels and Diamonds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 15, 2000, at 7
(claiming that Sierra Leone insurgents control diamond mines and use money from
sale of diamonds to fund continued war effort); Colin Nickerson, 'Conflict-Free'Diamonds
Could Be Boon to Canada, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that diamonds
in some African nations have been used to finance insurgency); Barbara Crossette,
Rwandan Leader, in U.S., Urges Push for Peace in Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at A4
(expressing concern that insurgents in Congo are fighting for control of diamond min-
ing regions); Diamond Leaders in Pact to Ban 'Conflict Gems'Funding African Wars, July 19,
2000, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/07/19/africa.diamonds.01.
reut/index.html [hereinafter Diamond Leaders in Pact] (explaining that diamonds from
conflict zones have been used to fund wars); In Africa, Diamonds as Gods' Tears, Jan. 19,
2001, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/518809.asp (claiming that diamonds are ex-
changed for arms in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Democratic Republic of Congo); 60
Minutes, supra note 12, at 20 (noting Bob Simon alleging that insurgents in Sierra Le-
one trade diamonds for cash and weapons); GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS 2
(2000), available at http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/conflict/
cover.htm [hereinafter CONFLICT DIAMONDS] (claiming that insurgent movements in
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo have used diamonds to pay
for arms and fund war); HRW-ANGoIA, supra note 13, at 57 (reporting that Angolan
insurgents obtain weapons through sale of diamonds).
15. See BRITTAIN, supra note 14, at 67, 74, 81 (asserting that Angolan insurgents
used diamonds to pay for South African and Zairian mercenaries and weapons); PAUL
RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAINFOREST: WAR, YOUTH AND RESOURCES IN SIERRA LEONE
42 (1996) (alleging that insurgents and government soldiers in Sierra Leone are con-
cerned with controlling diamonds to trade for weapons in order to continue war);
HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 15 (claiming that insurgent leader in Sierra Leone traded
diamonds for arms); Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (alleging that insurgents in Sierra
Leone sell diamonds in exchange for weapons); Sheryl Dickey, Sierra Leone: Diamonds
for Arms, 7 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9, 9 (2000) (claiming that insurgents in Sierra Leone and
other African nations use diamonds to procure arms and to obtain money); Douglas
Farah, Rebels Get Arms Through Burkina Faso, Sources Say, WASH. POST, May 6, 2000, at Al5
(claiming that insurgents in Sierra Leone and Angola obtain weapons from Burkina
Faso through diamond trade); Rocks That Kill, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1999, at 42, 42
(maintaining that Angolan insurgents have bought many weapons through diamond
sales); Robert Collier, Glittering Currencies of African Warfare, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 6, 2000,
at Al (reporting that in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone,
insurgent groups have amassed arsenals through diamond trade, allowing them to con-
tinue fighting); Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (asserting that insurgents in Angola
and Sierra Leone obtain weapons through diamond sales); 60 Minutes, supra note 12, at
20 (noting Bob Simon alleging that Sierra Leone insurgents use diamonds to obtain
weapons and cash); Conciliation Resources, supra note 13 (claiming that many
diamonds are directly exchanged for arms and ammunition); Final Report of the Monitor-
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in these nations has led to extensive human rights abuses by
these insurgent groups. a6 The insurgents would not have the
money to buy arms and commit human rights abuses without the
willingness of diamond buyers to trade with them.17 For these
ing Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, U.N. SCOR, para. 165, U.N. Doc. S/AC.31/2000/
CRP.1 (2000) [hereinafter U.N. Final Report] (maintaining that financial power pro-
vided by control of diamond mines in Angola has permitted insurgents to obtain weap-
ons and preserve their extensive network abroad).
16. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 10 (citing human rights abuses against civilians by
insurgent group in Sierra Leone); Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 182 (alleging
that Sierra Leone insurgents victimized civilians to instill fear in them); Coll, supra note
1, at W14 (maintaining that insurgents in Sierra Leone engaged in deliberate attacks
against civilians); Cindy Shiner, Ravaged Angolan Town Trying to Rebuild as Truce Takes
Hold, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at A16 (reporting that Angolan conflict is particularly
dangerous for civilians because land mines now cover many fields where civilians used
to farm); Caroline Hawley, A Country Torn &y Conflict, Jan. 12, 1999, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/special-report/1999/01/99/sierraleone/newsid_251000/2513 7 7
(reporting about civilian suffering in Sierra Leone conflict); Gberie, supra note 13
(claiming that Sierra Leone insurgents target civilians rather than armed opponents);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Sierra Leone, in ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 208, 209 (2000) (re-
porting that insurgent groups in Sierra Leone deliberately target civilians). See generally
HRW-ANGoLA, supra note 13, at 88 (documenting human rights violations against civil-
ian populations in Angola); Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Mur-
der, Mutilation, Rape: Summary, July 1999, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1999/sierra/SIERLE99.htm#P2_0 [hereinafter HRW-Sierra Leone: Summary] (exposing
human rights abuses against civilians in Sierra Leone). Commentators also accuse the
Sierra Leone and Angolan governments of human rights abuses. See DEP'T OF STATE,
Sierra Leone, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RiGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999, at 433, 434
(2000) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE, Sierra Leone] (reporting that Sierra Leone govern-
ment forces engaged in extrajudicial killings and summary executions); DEP'T OF STATE,
Angola, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999, at 1, 2 (2000)
[hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE, Angola] (asserting that security forces in Angola are re-
sponsible for multiple extrajudicial killings and acts of torture); HRW-ANGOLA, supra
note 13, at 61 (claiming that Angolan government troops killed civilians, engaged in
torture, and recruited child soldiers); HRW-Sierra Leone: Summary, supra (asserting that
forces defending Sierra Leone government summarily executed rebel prisoners and
suspected rebel collaborators).
17. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 160, (explaining that Angolan in-
surgents sell diamonds to foreign buyers); U.N. Exposes Angola Diamond Trade, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid1082000/1082425.stm (reporting
that U.N. implicated De Beers and other foreign companies as participants in conflict
diamond trade); Gberie, supra note 13 (claiming that military offensive against insur-
gents in Sierra Leone will not be effective without simultaneous economic measures);
see also Barbara Crossette, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader Reportedly Smuggled Gems, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2000, at 14 (claiming that foreign companies negotiated with RUF insurgent
leader to obtain diamonds); Mark Duffield, Geography and the Boundaries of Confidence:
Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History?, 23 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (1999) (maintaining that global corporations aid criminal activity
associated with modern day conflicts); Diamond Traders Act on Africa War Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at C21 [hereinafter Diamond Traders Act] (recognizing diamond
industry's responsibility to ensure that diamonds do not originate in conflict zones).
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diamond buyers, the practice of indirectly funding human rights
violations represents a possible violation of international law.
18
This Note focuses on the accountability of corporations for
indirectly fueling civil wars by purchasing diamonds from insur-
gent groups. While many corporations are involved in the dia-
mond industry,19 De Beers20 controls a majority of the uncut dia-
18. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Vol. 6,
Supp. No. 12, at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]
(stating that complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity are violations of
international law); see also Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 336, 391-92 (1998) (noting that
Holocaust victim litigation against Swiss banks considers funding war crimes as complic-
ity in war crimes and, therefore, alleges that banks violated international law).
19. See CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 3-7 (explaining structure of diamond
industry). In Sierra Leone, private security firms have become involved in the diamond
industry, providing protection to the government of Sierra Leone in exchange for dia-
mond concessions. See Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 75, 96, 100 (1998) (reporting that Executive Outcomes, South African-based
security company, has been directly involved in Sierra Leone civil war, taking diamond
mining concessions as part of its payment for mercenary services); Van Niekerk, supra
note 12, at 19 (maintaining that Executive Outcomes obtained diamond mine conces-
sions by providing services to Sierra Leone government); Coll, supra note 1, at W24
(claiming that Sierra Leone government paid Executive Outcomes partially through
diamond mine concessions); Conciliation Resources, supra note 13 (maintaining that
Executive Outcomes had close ties with diamond company called Branch Energies); see
also IAN SMILLIE ET AL., THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN
SECURITY 58-65 (2000), available at http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org/english/
esierra.html (indicating that some minor diamond corporations have substantial con-
nections with private security firms involved in Sierra Leone). See generally HIRSCH,
supra note 1, at 37-40 (explaining role of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone war).
20. See generally STEFAN KANFER, THE LAST EMPIR: DE BEERS, DIAMONDS, AND THE
WORLD (1993). Cecil Rhodes created the De Beers Company in 1880 after gaining
control of a diamond mine in South Africa called De Beers. See id. at 87 (noting that
when Cecil Rhodes created De Beers Company in 1880, company had assets of
£200,000); BRIAN ROBERTS, CECIL RHODES: FLAWED COLOSSUS 40 (1987) (reporting that
Rhodes controlled important section of De Beers mine, allowing formation of De Beers
Company); ANTONY THOMAS, RHODES 117 (1996) (explaining that initial aim of De
Beers was to regulate diamond production and marketing). In 1888, Rhodes acquired
the Kimberley diamond mine and formed De Beers Consolidated Mines. KANFER,
supra, at 101-07; ROBERTS, supra, at 84, 90; THOMAS, supra, at 172-81; EDWARD JAY EP-
STEIN, THE RISE AND FALL OF DIAMONDS 70-75 (1982); 60 Minutes, supra note 12, at 16-17.
In 1926, Ernest Oppenheimer, owner of a gold mining operation called Anglo Ameri-
can Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., joined the board of De Beers and became the
head of the diamond syndicate. KANFFR, supra, at 180-84, 205-7; EPSTEIN, supra, at 83-84.
Today, De Beers owns 35% of Anglo American. See Anglo American: Diamonds, at
http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/diamonds/ (stating that De Beers has 35% holding
in Anglo American); see also Alex Duval Smith, The Gem Trail: Diamonds-From Angolan
Mine to Third Finger on Left Hand, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 13, 1999, at 18 (main-
taining that Anglo American and De Beers are intertwined with each owning about
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mond 21 market, including mining, buying, and selling uncut
diamonds.2 Therefore, this Note will analyze whether De Beers
may be held liable for knowingly funding war criminals under
the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA").25
Part I of this Note examines the trade in conflict
diamonds24 in Angola and Sierra Leone and De Beers's involve-
42% of other company). In 1990, De Beers split into two companies, De Beers Consoli-
dated Mines, Ltd., based in South Africa, and De Beers Centenary AG, based in Switzer-
land. Anglo American: Diamonds, supra; Dale J. Montpelier, Diamonds Are Forever? Im-
plications of United States Antitrust Statutes on International Trade and the De Beers Diamond
Cartel, 24 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 277, 285-86 (1994). In February, 2001, De Beers an-
nounced that Anglo American would buy the South African and Swiss corporations for
US$17,600,000,000. See Alan Cowell & Rachel L. Swarns, $17.6 Billion Deal to Make De
Beers Private Company, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at WI (explaining that consortium
called DB Investments, in which Anglo American and Oppenheimer family each have
45% stake, will buy out De Beers stockholders). As a result of the deal, De Beers and
Anglo American will be merged into one privately held corporation run by Nicky Op-
penheimer. See id. (stating that Anglo American will provide financial support for crea-
tion of new private De Beers).
21. See SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 26-27 (explaining that most rough
diamonds are sent to De Beers's Central Selling Organization in London where they
are sorted according to variety of categories, such as size, color, and quality). De Beers
sells uncut, or rough, diamonds to diamond buyers who then cut and polish the gems
into finished products for sale on the consumer market. See SMILLIE, supra note 19, at
26-27 (maintaining that De Beers's Central Selling Organization sells to pre-selected
buyers at events called sites, which occur 10 times per year); see also Nicholas Stein,
Inside the Diamond Factory: How Rough Stones are Fashioned into Sparkling Gems in the Jewely
Store Window, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 208, 208-09 (explaining process of cutting and
polishing rough diamonds); 60 Minutes, supra note 12, at 19 (noting Bob Simon exam-
ining De Beers' process of selling rough stones to buyers who then cut and polish
stones for sale to consumers).
22. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (maintaining that De Beers mines 50% of
world's diamonds and controls 70 to 80% of sales from producers to diamond cutters
and dealers); Collier, supra note 15, at Al (claiming that De Beers controls diamond
industry, participating in most mining itself and also buying diamonds wholesale on
open market); Smith, supra note 20, at 18 (maintaining that De Beers sells 80% of all
uncut diamonds, representing both diamonds from its own mines and diamonds ex-
tracted by others); SMILuE ET AL., supra note 19, at 22 (asserting that De Beers is in-
volved in mining majority of diamonds and acquires most diamonds produced). Com-
mentators claim that De Beers controls between 60 and 80% of the trade in uncut
diamonds. Compare Charles Pretzlik, De Beers Finalising Deal with Luxury Group LVMH,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at 1 (asserting that De Beers controls 60% of uncut diamond
trade), with Global Witness, A Rough Trade, The Role of De Beers and the CSO in the Dia-
mond Business Dec. 1998, at http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/
industry.htm [hereinafter De Beers and the CSO] (claiming that De Beers controls 80% of
global diamond sales through its Central Selling Organization).
23. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 [hereinafter ATCA] (stating that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States").
24. See CONFLIcT DIAMONOS, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that conflict diamonds are
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ment in this trade. Part II examines case law developments
under the ATCA and obstacles to recovery against multinational
corporations25 ("MNCs") under the ATCA. Part II also outlines
efforts made by international organizations, the U.S. govern-
ment, and MNCs to regulate the activities of MNCs in host coun-
tries.2 6 Part III argues that De Beers should be liable under the
ATCA for complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity
by funding insurgent groups engaged in human rights viola-
tions.2' This Note concludes that the ATCA should be amended
and offers a proposal for legislation to make MNCs liable for
their involvement in human rights abuses. Under an amended
ATCA, De Beers could be held accountable for its part in the
conflict diamond trade.
I. THE HEART OF THE MATTER: DIAMONDS,
DESTRUCTION, AND DE BEERS
A. Conflict Diamonds: The Setting
Observers note that the conflict diamond trade occurs in
regions where diamonds are mined by insurgent groups and
then sold for arms or cash. 28  While commentators claim that
ending the conflict diamond trade may be an important element
gems that come from areas under control of forces that are opposed to legitimate gov-
ernment); see alsoJackie Cillers, Vintage Point-Dirty Diamonds, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Apr. 7,
2000, at 11 (stating that some commentators refer to this trade as "gemocide," describ-
ing theft of diamonds to fund insurgent wars).
25. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating In-
ternational Law, 4 UCLAJ. INT'L & FOR. Ari. 81, 81 n.1 (1999) (stating that term mul-
tinational corporation ("MNC") is used to describe private commercial company that
controls production or service facilities in countries other than country in which it is
based).
26. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 86 & n.14 (stating that term MNC implies home
country, meaning country of incorporation, and host country, meaning country of op-
eration or production).
27. See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 18 (stating that "[c]omplicity in the com-
mission of a crime against the peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set
forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law").
28. See BRITrAIN, supra note 14, at 67, 74 (asserting that Angolan insurgents buy
weapons with diamonds); RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 42 (claiming that insurgents in
Sierra Leone are concerned with controlling diamonds to trade for weapons in order to
finance war); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 15 (alleging that RUF leader in Sierra Leone
traded diamonds for arms); Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (maintaining that RUF
soldiers in Sierra Leone sell diamonds to obtain weapons); Dickey, supra note 15, at 9
(claiming that insurgents in Sierra Leone and other African nations use diamonds to
procure arms and obtain money); Duke, supra 14, at A27 (claiming that Angolan com-
batants finance war with diamonds); see also CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 1
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of ending the civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, there are
serious difficulties with stopping these exchanges.29 Particularly,
no technology currently exists that can identify diamonds by
their source once they are on the market."0 Additionally, smug-
gling and trading through multiple intermediaries present obsta-
cles to determining where a diamond originated.3'
1. Clarifying the Terms
Conflict diamonds are diamonds mined or stolen by insur-
gent forces in opposition to the legitimate government. 32 Insur-
(stating that conflict diamonds originate in territory held by rebel forces in opposition
to legitimate government).
29. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 43-44 (2000) (statement of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President
and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc., on behalf of World Diamond
Council) (asserting that curtailing trade in conflict diamonds will be difficult because
scientists claim it is impossible to identify origin of diamond without destroying it and
that only method for effectively curbing trade in conflict diamonds is establishment of
systematic international tracking system requiring cooperation between diamond indus-
try, governments, and international organizations); African Diamonds: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 73-74 (2000) (state-
ment of William E. Boyajian, President, Gemological Institute of America) (claiming
that tracking system to determine origin of diamonds will require increased coopera-
tion on private, national, and international level and noting that identification technol-
ogies for determining origin of diamonds are not yet developed); SMiLLIE ET AL., supra
note 19, at 33-34 (noting lack of initiatives to combat smuggling in diamond industry,
making tracking of diamonds difficult).
30. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 39 (2000) (statement of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President
and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc., on behalf of World Diamond
Council) (claiming that diamonds cannot be truly identified by original source without
destroying diamond); African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 73 (2000) (statement of William E. Boyajian, President,
Gemological Institute of America) (stating that technology for identifying diamonds by
their source currently does not exist); see also CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 8
(acknowledging that technological methodologies for identifying diamonds by source
need further development but claiming that identifying diamonds by surface character-
istics may be effective initially in determining origin of diamond).
31. See SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 33 (claiming that few paper trails exist to
trace true source of diamonds); DAVID E. KOSKOFF, THE DIAMOND WORLD 3-4, 151
(1981) (asserting that smuggling is commonplace in diamond industry).
32. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 42 (2000) (statement of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President
and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc., on behalf of World Diamond
Council) (explaining that conflict diamonds are diamonds illegally extracted and sold
by rebel movements in exchange for weapons); De Beers, Written Testimony Before the
United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee
on Africa, Hearings into the Issue of 'Conflict Diamonds' (May 9, 2000), at 4 [hereinafter
Hearing on Conflict Diamonds], available at http://www.debeersgroup.com/hotTopics/
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gent groups sell diamonds to buy arms and obtain cash flow for
their war effort.3" Commentators speculate that the conflict dia-
mond trade comprises between four and fifteen percent of the
world trade in diamonds.34 Presently, conflict diamonds come
from Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.3" Until recently, international law has not deterred trad-
ers from engaging in trade with rebels groups. 6
cdActions0l.asp (offering definition of conflict diamonds stating that rebel groups
mine or steal these diamonds); CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that
conflict diamonds are diamonds that originate in territory held by rebel forces in oppo-
sition to legitimate government).
33. See BRITrAIN, supra note 14, at 67, 74 (asserting that insurgents in Angola pay
for South African and Zairian mercenaries and weapons with diamonds); RIcHARDs,
supra note 15, at 42 (alleging that insurgents and government soldiers in Sierra Leone
are concerned with controlling diamonds to trade for weapons in order to continue
war); HIRscH, supra note 1, at 15 (claiming that insurgent leader in Sierra Leone traded
diamonds for arms); Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (alleging that insurgents in Sierra
Leone sell diamonds in exchange for weapons); Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming
that insurgents in Sierra Leone and other African nations use diamonds to procure
arms and obtain money); Farah, supra note 15, at A15 (claiming that insurgents in
Sierra Leone and Angola obtain weapons from Burkina Faso through diamond trade);
Rocks That Kill, supra note 15, at 42 (maintaining that Angolan insurgents have bought
many weapons through diamond sales).
34. See, e.g., African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Tony P. Hall, Rep. Ohio) (claim-
ing that although conflict diamond trade makes up only between five and 15% of total
diamond trade, conflict diamond trade produces 30% of all profits from diamond trade
because diamonds from Angola and Sierra Leone have particularly high value); Kelly
Kleiman, Price is Too High for Some Gems, Groups Say, CHI. Trm., Feb. 7, 2001, at S1 (stat-
ing that De Beers estimates conflict diamond trade as four percent of total diamond
trade); African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 106th Cong. 42 (2000) (statement of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President and
Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc., on behalf of World Diamond Coun-
cil) (claiming that 96% of diamonds come from legitimate sources); 60 Minutes, supra
note 12, at 21 (noting Bob Simon reporting that group working on conflict diamond
issue claims trade is more than four percent of world diamond trade); Kleiman, supra
(explaining that activist group claims conflict diamond trade comprises 10 to 15% of
total diamond trade); Kate Dunn, Tainted Gems Lose Sparkle as Prices Fall, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 27, 2000, at 1 (claiming that conflict diamonds represent somewhere
between four and 15% of world diamond trade).
35. See Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (reporting that rebels in Angola, Sierra
Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo sell diamonds in exchange for arms); Col-
lier, supra note 15, at Al (claiming that civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo are financed by conflict diamond trade); CONFLICT DIAMONDS,
supra note 14, at 2 (noting that conflict diamond trade fuels wars in Angola, Sierra
Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo).
36. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Tony P. Hall, Rep. Ohio) (noting that
diamond traders were willing to trade with rebels throughout 1990s).
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2. A Rock in a Hard Place
The United States has responded to the trade in conflict
diamonds by proposing that all diamonds imported into the
United States have certificates of origin.3 7 Because many na-
tions' economies profit from legitimate diamond trade, and only
certain countries produce conflict diamonds, determining the
origin of diamonds is preferable to a total ban on diamonds.38
Thus, identification of a diamond's source is essential to stop-
ping the conflict diamond trade in these countries. 39
Representatives from the diamond industry have asserted
the impossibility of identifying the source of individual rough
diamonds without destroying the diamond. 40 Commentators al-
37. See Clean Diamonds Act, H.R. 918, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2001) (proposing
that diamonds imported into United States have certificate stating country of origin);
African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means,
106th Cong. 34 (2000) (statement of William B. Wood, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary, International Organization Affairs, U.S. State Department) (claiming that certifi-
cates of origin are only way to regulate diamonds until technology is developed to mark
diamonds); see also Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming that under current system,
diamonds' place of origin is registered as country it was exported from and observing
that this registration does not always harmonize with country diamond actually
originated in).
38. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 15 (2000) (statement of Frank R. Wolf, Rep. Va.) (explaining
that Botswanan and South African economies, which produce legitimate diamonds,
would suffer from consumer boycott of diamonds); African Diamonds: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 42 (2000) (statement
of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America,
Inc., on behalf of World Diamond Council) (emphasizing importance of legitimate dia-
mond trade to many countries); Clean Diamonds Act, H.R. 918 § 2(6) (recognizing
damage that consumer boycott would do to legitimate diamond trade).
39. See CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 8 (stating that identification of origin
of each diamond is central to debate over conflict diamonds); see also Dickey, supra note
15, at 11 (asserting that critics of certificate of origin schemes claim that plan is too
difficult to implement).
40. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 39 (2000) (statement of Matthew A. Runci, Ph.D., President
and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc., on behalf of World Diamond
Council) (claiming that diamonds cannot be accurately identified by origin without
destroying diamond); African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 73 (2000) (statement of William E. Boyajian, President,
Gemological Institute of America) (stating that there is currently no practical way of
identifying diamonds by their source); African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 69 (2000) (statement of J.F.
'Jack" Jolis, President, Rough Diamond Consultancy) (claiming that there is unin-
formed discussion about marking diamonds, which, if possible, would destroy diamond
in process).
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lege, however, that experts can identify diamonds from different
regions through a variety of techniques, including simply look-
ing at their surface features.4' Although identifying diamonds
by surface features is not a precise science, a combination of
identification techniques could be used to determine a dia-
mond's origin.4 2 At least one commentator argues that these
methods may be equally useful to exclude those regions from
where a diamond did not originate.43
3. Dealer in the Rough
Commentators note that tracing the origin of conflict
diamonds is further complicated by the smuggling culture in the
diamond business." A recent U.N. report on the Angolan con-
flict diamond trade explains the complex organizational struc-
ture of modern day diamond smuggling.45 Diamonds are sus-
41. See CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 10 (stating that surface features can
be useful in identifying source of diamonds); see also SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 69
(recognizing that identifying diamonds by surface features can only be applied to
rough gems); Robert Block, Smashing Diamonds: Industry's Future Rests on Pinpointing
Origin of Each Gem, HOUSTON CHRON., July 23, 2000, at 4 (asserting that De Beers admits
ability to recognize diamonds from broad areas by examining surface features).
Diamonds have distinct surface features according to their region of origin, created
either by the particular growth of the crystal or by external factors such as distinguish-
ing scratches on the surface of the stone caused by abrasion from other stones. See
CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 10 (explaining surface features of diamonds as
identifying characteristic).
42. See CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 10 (claiming that combination of
surface characteristics techniques could help to develop methodology for identifying
diamonds by place of origin). Currently, experts are developing technologies for iden-
tifying the exact place of origin of diamonds. See id. at 13-15 (outlining various meth-
ods that can be used to identify birthplace of diamonds). But see African Diamonds:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 19
(2000) (statement of Donald M. Payne, Rep. NJ.) (asserting that it is incredible that De
Beers, with amount of diamonds they handle, has not developed technology to mark
diamonds).
43. See CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 14, at 15 (quoting Royal Canadian
Mounted Police stating that identification technologies may provide conclusive evi-
dence that diamonds did not originate in particular location).
44. See SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 33 (asserting that there are few paper trails
to trace true source of diamonds); KosKonF, supra note 31, at 3-4, 151 (claiming that
smuggling is commonplace in diamond industry); RICHARDS, supra note 15, at 50 (main-
taining that smuggling is common because diamonds are easy to conceal); African
Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. 14 (2000) (statement of Frank R. Wolf, Rep. Va.) (claiming that at least
US$40,000,000,000 worth of diamonds has been smuggled out of conflict diamond
countries).
45. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, para. 150-206 (examining system of smug-
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ceptible to smuggling because they are small and easy to con-
ceal.46 Observers state that the diamond industry's lack of
transparency makes it difficult to combat smuggling. 47 Smug-
gling usually involves trading diamonds through multiple buyers,
or intermediaries, which presents further difficulties in tracing
diamond trade routes.48
B. The Civil Wars: The Carat and the Stick
The civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone are examples of
insurgent movements using diamonds to finance wars against of-
ficial governments.49 The civil war in Angola has continued on
gling diamonds by insurgents in Angola in exchange for arms and cash); Barbara Cross-
ette, U.N. Study of Diamonds-for-Arms Deals Focuses on Shadowy Trader, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2000, at A12 (reporting that trade of diamonds for arms in Angola is internationally
organized, well connected, and well funded); see also RicHARDs, supra note 15, at 50
(asserting that conditions of civil war make tracking diamonds even more difficult).
46. See KoSKOFF, supra note 31, at 3 (claiming that portability of diamonds makes
diamond trade ungovernable with respect to smuggling); Buchan et al., supra note 14,
at 6 (maintaining that diamonds are often smuggled because they are small, easy to
hide, and quick source of cash); Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (stating that diamonds are
easy to smuggle because they are tiny).
47. See Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (asserting that diamond industry is largely
self regulated with few formal contracts, therefore, preventing trade in conflict
diamonds is difficult); African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 13 (2000) (statement of Mayer Herz, Vice-Presi-
dent, Diamond Acquisitions MONDERA.com) (commenting that corruption and brib-
ery are normal in diamond world); Collier, supra note 15, at Al (noting that diamond
industry is called secretive and insular); Mark Honigsbaum & Chris Gordon, Diamonds
Are a Guerrilla's Best Friend, OBSERVER, June 13, 1999, at 23 (maintaining that there is
little transparency in diamond trade); Global Witness, A Rough Trade, Business is Busi-
ness, Dec. 1998, at http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/busi-
ness.htm (claiming that diamond industry has refused to ensure transparency and ac-
countability for eliminating trade in conflict diamonds). But see Interview by Martin
Rapaport with Nicky Oppenheimer, Chairman of De Beers Consolidated Mines,
London (July 27, 2000) (citing Oppenheimer who claimed external audit of diamond
sources is unnecessary because De Beers guarantees that its diamonds are not from
conflict zones and such guarantees are not made lightly).
48. See De Beers and the CSO, supra note 22 (asserting that number of intermediaries
involved in diamond trade inhibits effective tracking of diamonds); African Diamonds:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 59
(2000) (statement ofJeffrey Fischer, President, Diamond Manufacturers and Importers
Association of America) (commenting that diamonds can be sold and re-sold many
times before reaching retail market).
49. See BRITrAIN, supra note 14, at 67, 74 (claiming that Angolan insurgents bought
weapons with revenue from diamond sales for continuation of war); Farah, supra note
15, at A15 (reporting that insurgents in Sierra Leone and Angola use diamonds to buy
weapons from Burkina Faso in order to continue fighting); Rocks That Kill, supra note
15, at 42 (claiming that Angolan insurgents have financed recent return to war through
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and off since the 1960s,5 ° and diamonds are essential to main-
taining the insurgent war effort there.51 The civil war in Sierra
Leone is more recent, beginning in 1991,52 and insurgent
groups there also use diamonds to buy weapons for use in the
fighting. 3 Commentators assert that the trade in conflict
diamonds has prolonged the length of the violence in Angola
and Sierra Leone.54
sale of diamonds); Collier, supra note 15, at Al (asserting that insurgents in Angola and
Sierra Leone use money from diamond sales to buy weapons and maintain war effort);
Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (asserting that Sierra Leone insurgents are able to continue
war offensives through financing from diamond sales).
50. See JAMES CIMENT, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, POSTCOLONIAL WARS IN SOUTH-
ERN AsiucA 39 (1997) (noting that uprising in Luanda, capital of Angola, in 1961 was
beginning of war in Angola);JoHN MARCUM, THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION VOLUME I: THE
ANATOMY OF AN ExPLOSION (1950-1962), at 123-26 (1969) (examining initial violence in
Angola in 1961); INGE TVEDTEN, ANGOLA: STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION
36-44 (1997) (describing fighting between Popular Movement for the Liberation of An-
gola ("MPLA") and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ("UNITA")
in Angola between 1975 and 1990 as Second War of Liberation and explaining that war
continued through 1990s with breakdown of peace agreement in 1992); HRW-ANGOLA,
supra note 13, at 8 (claiming that Angolan civil war has continued since independence).
51. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 165 (claiming that Angolan insur-
gents' ability to continue fighting is provided through sale of diamonds); BiuTrAIN,
supra note 14, at 67, 74, 81 (maintaining that insurgent soldiers in Angola buy arms
through sale of diamonds and that diamonds are essential to survival of insurgent move-
ment); Duke, supra note 14, at A27 (claiming that Angolan insurgents finance war with
diamonds mined from territory that they occupy); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (alleg-
ing that diamond smuggling by insurgent forces in Angola provides revenues for guns
and food for soldiers).
52. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 126-27 (noting that initial
violence in 1991 was result of conflict in neighboring country, Liberia); Zarate, supra
note 19, at 95 (stating that RUF has been at war against government since 1991).
53. See HIRscH, supra note 1, at 25 (maintaining that insurgents in Sierra Leone
use diamonds to sustain war effort); Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (claiming that
RUF soldiers in Sierra Leone use diamonds to finance civil war); Vo, supra note 14, at 7
(noting that insurgents in Sierra Leone control many diamond mines and use revenues
from mines to pay for weapons).
54. See BRrrrAIN, supra note 14, at 89 (asserting that Angolan insurgent group's
delay in peace negotiations allowed immense profit through conflict diamond sales);
Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 192 (alleging that partnership between insurgent
fighters and illicit diamond miners is fundamental reason for continuation of war in
Sierra Leone); Drogin, supra note 13, atAl (maintaining that illicit diamond trade may
prevent lasting peace in Angola); Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming that conflict
diamond trade has extended war in Sierra Leone, allowing more human rights abuses
to occur); see also Duffield, supra note 17, at 28-29 (theorizing that chaos caused by
conflict provides opportunity for criminals to make considerable profits through smug-
gling).
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1. Angola
The Portuguese colonized Angola and controlled the re-
gion until 1975 when the Portuguese government granted An-
gola's independence.55 Since Angola's independence, civil war
has engulfed Angola as insurgent forces struggle against the Pop-
ular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 56 ("MPLA"), the
ruling party in AngolaY.5  The insurgent forces, called the Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola
58
("UNITA"), occupied a majority of the diamond producing ar-
eas in Angola in the 1990s 59 and have used revenues from dia-
mond mining and trading to buy more arms for continued fight-
ing.
6 0
a. History of Angola
For most of the twentieth century, the Portuguese con-
55. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY 3, 159 (Thomas Collelo ed., 1989) (stating that
Portugal granted independence to Angola in 1975); MARGARET JOAN ANSTEE, ORPHAN
OF THE COLD WAR 8 (1996) (reporting that Angola achieved independence in 1975).
56. See CIMENT, supra note 51, at 11 (explaining that MPLA, founded in 1956, has
dominated government in Angola since independence and detailing broad history of
MPLA); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 170-71 (explaining background
of MPLA); FERNANDO ANDRESEN GUIMARAES, THE ORIGINS OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR
37-48 (1998) (examining history and development of MPLA).
57. See TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 32-44 (explaining that Angola has been at war
since independence except for brief period of peace from 1991 until 1992); HRW-AN-
GOLA, supra note 13, at 8 (noting that war has continued in Angola since 1975 except
for brief peace in early 1990s).
58. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 94-95 (explaining that UNITA was officially
founded in 1966 byJonas Savimbi after he became disillusioned with other nationalist
groups in Angola); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 32, 187 (examining
history of UNITA).
59. See Duke, supra note 14, at A27 (asserting that UNITA controlled most Ango-
lan diamond fields in late 1990s); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (stating that UNITA
produced majority of Angolan diamonds in 1996); Judith Matdoff, Going for the Glint:
Diamonds Keep War in Angola Alive, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1 (claim-
ing that UNITA occupied majority of diamond mines in Angola in 1992); Christopher
McDougall, In Angola, Diamonds are a Struggling Smugglr's Best Friend, L.A. TIMES, June
13, 1993, at A9 (reporting that insurgent groups in Angola control diamond mines).
60. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 165 (maintaining UNITA has abil-
ity to continue fighting through diamond sales); BRI-TAIN, supra note 14, at 67, 74, 81
(claiming that UNITA purchases weapons through diamond sales and that diamonds
are integral part of UNITA survival); Duke, supra note 14, atA27 (claiming that UNITA
uses revenue from diamond trade to finance war effort); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al
(alleging that revenues from diamond trade provide weapons and nourishment for
UNITA soldiers).
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trolled Angola.6 1 Although the first Portuguese explorer arrived
in Angola in 1483,62 the Portuguese did not establish a colony in
Angola until 1576 when they founded their first town in Angola,
called Luanda. 63 Portugal subsequently used Angola as its pri-
mary source of slaves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries.6 4 Portugal continued to gain control over Angolan territory
throughout the nineteenth century and by 1930, Portugal con-
sidered Angola an important Portuguese colony.65
The war in Angola began in 1961 as a war of independence
against Portuguese colonialism.6 6 In the 1950s and 1960s, anti-
colonialist sentiment gave rise to three nationalist movements.6 7
61. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 3, 159 (stating that Angola
escaped Portuguese rule in 1975); ANSTEE, supra note 55, at 8 (reporting that Angola
received independence in 1975); GuiMARAEs, supra note 56, at 93 (explaining agree-
ment that set independence date as November 11, 1975); Chas W. Freeman, The An-
gola/Namibia Accords, FOREIGN AFF., Summer, 1989, at 126, 127 (noting that Portugal
granted independence to Angola in 1975).
62. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 7 (claiming that Diogo Cdo,
Portuguese explorer, arrived in Angola in 1483); MARCUM, supra note 50, at 1 (noting
that Diogo Cfo appeared in Angola in 1483 and took return trip to Angola in 1485);
TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 17 (maintaining that Diogo Cdo reached mouth of Zaire
River in 1483).
63. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 9 (claiming that Portugal did
not begin to establish control in Angola until 1576 because its attention was on Asia and
Americas); MARCUM, supra note 50, at 2 (noting that Luanda developed as major slave
port for Portugal in 1576); TVEDTEN, supra note 62, at 19 (claiming that Portuguese
established system where Portuguese citizens could acquire property in Angola on con-
dition that they pay expenses of settling and defending land, allowing these citizens to
meet these expenses by taxing local population).
64. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 11 (claiming that slave trade
was main economic incentive for Portuguese expansion in Angola); MARCUM, supra
note 50, at 2 (asserting that Portugal exported 3,000,000 Angolans as slaves between
1580 and 1836); TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 18 (noting that Angola suffered heavier loss
of population due to slave trade than any other African nation).
65. See TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 23-26 (examining Portuguese expansion in An-
gola and Portuguese Colonial Act of 1930, declaring Angola integral part of nation);
MARCUM, supra note 50, at 4 (asserting that Portuguese controlled Angolan territory by
1930 and that in 1930s Portugal's colonies gained importance on national agenda).
66. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 39 (explaining that although there were minor
uprisings prior to 1961 against Portuguese colonialists in Angola, uprising in Luanda,
capital of Angola, was beginning of war in Angola); MARCUM, supra note 50, at 123-26
(examining first explosion of violence in Angola in 1961); Scott MacLeod, Angola:
Where Blossoms and Bullets Grow, TIME, Oct. 17, 1988, at 43, 43 (noting that fighting in
Angola began in 1961 as war of independence against Portugal).
67. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 38-39, 94 (explaining origins of MPLA, UNITA,
and National Front of Liberation of Angola ("FNLA")); GUIMARAES, supra note 56, at
31-33, 82 (examining nationalist character of anti-colonialist movements in Angola and
stating that by mid- to late-1960s three nationalist movements had clear presence in
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The MPLA, founded in 1956,68 drew support from urban dwell-
ers69 and professed a Marxist ideology.7" The National Front of
Liberation of Angola71 ("FNLA"), originally known as the Union
of the Peoples of Northern Angola and subsequently the Union
of Angolan Peoples,72 was composed mostly of Kikongo, or
Bakongo, people and had significant ties to Zaire.7" The third
nationalist group in Angola is UNITA, founded by Jonas Savimbi
in 1966."M  UNITA drew most of its support from the
Angola against Portuguese rule). Although the three groups adhered to different polit-
ical platforms, they shared the common goal of ending imperialism in Angola. See gener-
ally GUIMARAES, supra note 56, at 37-82 (examining three nationalist groups in pre-inde-
pendence Angola).
68. See GUINMARAES, supra note 56, at 42 (stating that official history of MPLA claims
that party was founded on December 10, 1956); CEMENT, supra note 50, at 39 (stating
that MPLA began in 1956).
69. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 161 (asserting that most
MPLA support was in urban centers); CIMENT, supra note 50, at 11 (claiming that MPLA
supporters were urban and intellectuals); Freeman, supra note 61, at 127 (maintaining
that MPLA drew support from people in Luanda, capital of Angola); Why Angola's Rebels
Will Fight On. And On., ECONOMisT, Nov. 23, 1997, at 42, 43 (stating that MPLA support
is cosmopolitan and urban-centered).
70. See TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 44 (stating that MPLA was strongly influenced by
Marxist thought); CIMENT, supra note 50, at 11 (claiming that MPLA's ideology was
socialist and nationalist); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 27 (asserting
that MPLA drew Marxist tendencies from influence of Portuguese Communist Party).
71. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 12 (noting that FNLA was founded in 1957 and
that movement did not survive long after independence when forces were defeated by
MPLA forces with Cuban assistance); GUIMARAES, supra note 56, at 48-57 (explaining
history of FNLA); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 27, 161 (reporting that
FNLA was founded in 1954). See generally MARCUM, supra note 50, at 49-100 (explaining
historical roots of FNLA).
72. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 12 (stating that FNLA took its name in 1961,
dropping regional aspects of previous names); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note
55, at 161 (explaining name changes of FNLA); GUIMARAES, supra note 56, at 55 (claim-
ing that formation of FNLA was effort to represent more ethnic groups within Angola).
73. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 12 (asserting that FNLA consistently drew support
from Kikongo people, many of whom lived in Zaire, and that leader of FNLA had close
ties to Zairian dictator, Joseph Mobutu); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at
27 (claiming that FNLA initially advocated for restoration of Bakongo kingdom, which
overlapped with Zaire, but later adopted Angolan nationalist agenda); TVEoTEN, supra
note 50, at 29 (asserting that FNLA drew most support from Kongo people in northern
provinces of Angola); Freeman, supra note 61, at 127 (stating that FNLA supporters
were Bakongo and that FNLA leader was related by marriage to Zairian dictator, Jospeh
Mobutu, leading to considerable backing for FNLA from Zaire).
74. See GUIMARAES, supra note 56, at 76 (stating that UNITA was founded in 1966
by Jonas Savimbi); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 32 (claiming that
UNITA emerged in 1966 with its attack on Vila Teixeira de Sousa, Angolan town now
renamed Luau).
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Ovimbundu people, the largest ethnic group in Angola.75 Com-
mentators note that the ideology of UNITA is largely an expres-
sion of Savimbi's own ideals, which have changed over the years
from Maoist to anti-communistic.76
After years of war between Angolan nationalist groups and
Portuguese colonialists, Portugal granted independence to An-
gola on November 11, 1975. 77 In the time preceding the date of
independence, the three nationalist groups turned against each
other in a struggle to gain control over Luanda, the capital, by
November 11. 7 ' The MPLA eventually gained control.7 9  The
FNLA joined forces with UNITA, realizing that neither group
could defeat the MPLA alone, and the combined forces declared
75. See GuIsAES, supra note 56, at 76 (claiming that prior to emergence of
UNITA, Ovimbundu people were not represented in Angolan nationalist movements);
CIMENT, supra note 50, at 12 (stating that Savimbi established UNITA base in central
Angola in Ovimbunduland); ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 32 (claiming
that UNITA represented Ovimbundu people, who comprised one third of Angolan
population); Freeman, supra note 61, at 127 (maintaining that UNITA represents
Ovimbundu, who are two fifths of Angolan population, and Balunda, who are about
one sixth of Angolan population).
76. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 12 (stating that UNITA's agenda has been recog-
nized as little more than expression of Savimbi's personal opinions and explaining that
initially Savimbi was self-proclaimed Maoist, but later he claimed anti-communist ideol-
ogy and in 1990s expressed commitment to multi-party democracy); BRITrAiN, supra
note 14, at 11 (stating that Savimbi professed Maoist ideology at one time and shifted
ideologies to anti-communism).
77. ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 159; ANSTEE, supra note 55, at 8;
BuTTIaN, supra note 14, at 1; GuimARAiEs, supra note 56, at 93; Freeman, supra note 61,
at 127; Alfredo E. Castro, The Forgotten War of Angola, AMERICA, Dec. 11, 1993, at 6, 6;
Tom Fennel & Stefan Lovgren, The Diamond War: Canada T7ies to Halt the Illegal Sales
Fuelling a Brutal Conflict, MAcLEAN's, Mar. 22, 1999, at 18, 19; HRW-ANGoLA, supra note
13, at 8.
78. See ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 159 (reporting that there was
effort to form coalition government at time of independence but it failed and civil war
began); BRITrAIN, supra note 14, at 2 (claiming that transitional power sharing agree-
ment between nationalist groups collapsed in January 1975); TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at
36 (asserting that inability of nationalist groups to work together was result of mutual
distrust and suspicion rather than difference in political ideology); ANSTEE, supra note
55, at 8 (noting that conflict broke out between MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA almost im-
mediately with transition to independence); HRW-ANGoLA, supra note 13, at 8 (claim-
ing that nationalist groups in Angola fought against each other in battle to control
capital city).
79. ANGOLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 162; CIMENT, supra note 50, at 51;
BRITTAIN, supra note 14, at 3; Castro, supra note 77, at 6;J.E. Spence, Southern Africa in
the Cold War: Post World War II Southern Africa, HISTORY TODAY, Feb. 1999, at 43, 47; Jon
Lee Anderson, Letter from Angola: Oil and Blood, NEw YORKER, Aug. 14, 2000, at 46, 50-
51.
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full-scale civil war against the Angolan government.
80
Angola had democratic elections in 1992 as a result of a
short-lived peace agreement.8' The war resumed after Savimbi
rejected the election results.8 2 In November 1994, UNITA and
the government signed the Lusaka Protocol,"3 attempting to end
the war, but fighting continues.8 4
b. Two Months Salary: Funding a Civil War
Commentators claim that UNITA controlled the majority of
diamond production and exportation in Angola in the 1990s. 5
UNITA used the revenue generated from the sale of diamonds
80. See TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 37 (claiming that FNLA and UNITA formed
alliance and declared civil war); ANSTEE, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that FNLA and
UNITA attempted to establish separate regime in Huambo, another city in Angola);
CIMENT, supra note 50, at 62 (asserting that South Africa recruited many members of
FNLA troops and integrated them into combined UNITA/South African force); AN-
COLA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 55, at 40, 162 (claiming that FNLA and UNITA
joined together in effort to establish rival government against MPLA).
81. John Battersby, Angolan Rebels Win Concessions After War Gains, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Apr. 22, 1993, at 8; Steven A. Holmes, Ending Long Hostility, U.S. Plans Ties
with Angola's Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1993, at Al; see also ANSTEE, supra note 55,
at 22 (explaining that peace agreement called Bicesse Accords called for ceasefire and
multiparty elections).
82. Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6; Zarate, supra note 19, at 94; BRITTAIN, supra
note 14, at 58-59; TVEDTEN, supra note 50, at 41; HRW-ANGoLA, supra note 13, at 12;
Castro, supra note 77, at 7; see also ANSTEE, supra note 61, at 199-238 (describing election
from viewpoint of U.N. Special Representative to Angola during that period).
83. See Lusaka Protocol, Nov. 15, 1994, available at http://www.angola.org/polit-
ics/pjlusaka.htm (calling for cease-fire and new elections); see also TVEDTEN, supra note
50, at 43 (observing that Lusaka Protocol provided for cease-fire, release of prisoners,
establishment of U.N. peacekeeping operation, and participation of UNITA in Angolan
government).
84. See Rachel L. Swarns, Angola's Goal: Stepping Back From the Abyss, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2000, at 1 (claiming that Savimbi returned to war in 1998); Global Witness, A
Rough Trade, Year by Year, Dec. 1998, at http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/re-
ports/Angola/year.htm (asserting that Angolan violence continued in 1998); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 31 (noting that war continued in Angola into
early 2000).
85. See Duke, supra note 14, at A27 (asserting that UNITA occupied most of dia-
mond fields in Angola in late 1990s); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (maintaining that
UNITA was largest diamond producer in Angola in 1996); Matloff, supra note 59, at 1
(claiming that UNITA gained control of majority of Angolan diamond mines in 1992);
McDougall, supra note 59, at A9 (reporting that Angolan insurgent groups control dia-
mond mines, while Angolan government controls oil fields); Global Witness, A Rough
Trade, Brief Overview of the Trade in Angolan Diamonds, Dec. 1998, at http://
www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/overview.htm (asserting that UNITA
controlled 90% of diamond exports between 1992 and 1994).
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extracted from their occupied territory to fund the war effort.8 6
Commentators speculate that UNITA made several billion dol-
lars in revenue in the 1990s in diamond trade alone.8 7
In June 1998, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
1176,"8 accelerating Resolution 1173, responding to the conflict
diamond trade.8 9 These resolutions combined to prohibit the
export of diamonds from Angola that are not certified by the
government.90 Nevertheless, there are significant loopholes,
through which conflict diamonds may still reach the outside
market.91
86. See U.N. FinalReport, supra note 15, at para. 165 (asserting that financial ability
of UNITA to continue fighting is provided through sale of diamonds); BRITrAIN, supra
note 14, at 67, 74, 81 (claiming that UNITA buys arms through sale of diamonds and
that diamonds are essential to survival of UNITA); Duke, supra note 14, at A27 (claim-
ing that UNITA finances war effort with diamonds mined from occupied territory);
Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (alleging that diamond smuggling allows UNITA forces to
continue fighting because revenues provide weaponry and food for soldiers); Global
Witness, A Rough Trade, The Role of Diamonds in Angola in the 1990s, Dec. 1998, at http://
www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/role.htm [hereinafter Diamonds in
Angola] (asserting that UNITA uses diamond sales to procure arms); HRW-ANGoLA,
supra note 13, at 57 (maintaining that UNITA is able to buy weapons with revenue from
diamond sales).
87. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at paras. 152, 171 (estimating that UNITA
made US$800,000,000 profit from diamond trade in 1996 and more than
US$150,000,000 in 1999); Peter Hawthorne, Diamonds In The Rough, TIME, Dec. 6, 1999,
at 64, 64-65 (claiming that UNITA made US$2,500,000,000 in diamond trade between
1992 and 1997); Diamonds in Angola, supra note 86 (claiming that UNITA made
US$3,720,000,000 from diamond trade between 1992 and 1998); Nicholas Shaxson,
Savimbi's Diamonds May Not Be Forever, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 3 (asserting that
UNITA made about US$666,000,000 in diamond sales in 1996); BIrrAN, supra note
14, at 89 (maintaining that UNITA's profit from conflict diamond trade in mid-1996
was about US$1,000,000 per day). But see Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at
4 (claiming that US$4,000,000,000 estimate of diamond revenue made by UNITA is
inaccurate and disregards fact that diamond fields in Angola often switched hands be-
tween UNITA and government forces in 1990s).
88. See S.C. Res. 1176, U.N. SCOR, 3894th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1176
(1998) (invoking Resolution 1173 to impose sanctions on Angola more quickly).
89. See S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 3891th mtg., para. 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173
(1998) (calling for freeze of UNITA assets and prohibiting diamond trading with
UNITA forces).
90. See S.C. Res. 1176, supra note 88, at para. 2 (accelerating Security Council Res-
olution 1173); S.C. Res. 1173, supra note 89, at para. 12(b) (forbidding import of Ango-
lan diamonds without official certificate of origin).
91. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 197 (commenting that, despite UN
sanctions on diamond trade in Angola, smugglers are still able to sell diamonds ob-
tained from insurgents in Angola); Dickey, supra note 15, at 11 (maintaining that dia-
mond trade with UNITA forces continues despite U.N. sanctions); Global Witness, A
Rough Trade, The U.N. Security Council Embargo on Unofficial Angolan Diamonds, Dec. 1998,
at http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/reports/Angola/unsc.htm [hereinafter
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2. Sierra Leone
The British colonized Sierra Leone as a settlement sight for
freed slaves.92 In 1961, Sierra Leone achieved independence
from the British93 and functioned as a one party state for many
years.94 The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 as a coup
d'etat organized by the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF"). 95
The RUF insurgents have occupied many of the diamond pro-
ducing areas in Sierra Leone 96 and they use the profits from dia-
mond sales to finance their continued fighting.97
a. History of Sierra Leone
The history of Sierra Leone is unique because Britain's ini-
tial involvement with the nation was an effort to repatriate slaves
UNSC Embargo] (claiming that U.N. sanctions have had minimal effect on UNITA dia-
mond trade). For example, Angolan diamonds require a certificate of origin while
diamonds exported from neighboring countries may only require a customs declara-
tion. UNSC Embargo, supra. If the diamonds are smuggled across the Angolan border,
they will not be subject to the same scrutiny as when they are exported directly from
Angola. See id.; see also Hawthorne, supra note 87, at 65 (calling U.N. sanctions "ineffec-
tive"); Rocks That Kill, supra note 15, at 42 (explaining that diamond dealers obtain
Angolan diamonds easily through neighboring countries).
92. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 23 (stating that in 1787, British established Free-
town, capital of Sierra Leone, as settlement area for repatriated slaves in 1787); MARTIN
KILSON, POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE: A STUDY OF THE MODERNIZATION
PROCESS IN SIERRA LEONE 1 (1966) (noting that British oversaw resettlement of freed
slaves in Freetown).
93. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that British
granted independence to Sierra Leone in 1961); Fred M. Hayward &Jimmy D. Kandeh,
Perspectives on Twenty-Five Years of Elections in Sierra Leone, in ELECTIONS IN INDEPENDENT
AFRICA 25, 29 (Fred M. Hayward ed., 1987) (stating that Sierra Leone received indepen-
dence in 1961).
94. See Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 32-39 (explaining that Sierra Leone
was one party state from 1978 until 1986); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that one
party state was established in 1977).
95. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 126-27 (stating that fight-
ing in Sierra Leone began in 1991); Zarate, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that RUF war
against Sierra Leone government started in 1991).
96. See Vo, supra note 14, at 7 (claiming that RUF has occupied diamond mining
areas for long time); Ewen MacAskill, Sierra Leone Crisis: Gems: How Precious Resource Has
Stoked the Fires of Conflict, GUARDIAN, May 9, 2000, at 4 (alleging that RUF controls major-
ity of Sierra Leone diamond mines); Zarate, supra note 19, at 95 (maintaining that RUF
dominated valuable diamond producing regions in early 1990s).
97. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 25 (claiming that RUF insurgents use profits from
diamond sales to sustain war effort); Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (asserting that
RUF soldiers finance civil war with diamonds); Vo, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that RUF
forces use revenues from diamond trade to purchase weapons).
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from the Western World.9" These repatriated slaves, known as
Creoles,99 settled in and around Freetown, a city in Sierra Leone,
in the late 1700s.100 The British claimed the Freetown area as a
Crown Colony in 1808, °10 and later extended their control over
inland areas, declaring the larger region a British Protectorate in
1896.112 The British maintained control of Sierra Leone until




Initially after independence, Sierra Leone experienced a
brief period of democratic rule.104 Siaka Stevens, representing
the All People's Congress, 10 5 was elected prime minister in
98. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DixoN-FYLE, supra note 1, at 27 (stating British squad-
rons intercepted slave ships near Sierra Leone and freed slaves); JOHN R. CARTWRIGHT,
POLITICS IN SIERRA LEONE 1947-67, at 15 (1970) (noting that in 1787, three hundred
freed slaves from London arrived in Freetown); HiHscn, supra note 1, at 23 (stating that
Freetown became British post and settlement area for repatriated slaves in 1787); PETER
Kup, THE STORY OF SIERRA LEONE 31 (1964) (asserting that effort to repatriate slaves was
result of humanitarian movement in Europe); KiLSON, supra note 92, at I (noting that
freed slaves settled in Freetown under British supervision).
99. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 98, at 15 (explaining that repatriated slaves were
known as Creoles); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining settlement of Freetown and
stating that Creole community assumed dominant position relative to indigenous peo-
ple); Kup, supra note 98, at 36 (reporting that Creoles descend from repatriated slaves).
100. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIxoN-FYLE, supra note 1, at 25, 27 (observing that
many freed slaves settled in Freetown in 1792 and that population of Freetown grew
significantly in early 1800s); Kup, supra note 98, at 31-36 (describing settlement of Free-
town); CARTWRIGHT, supra note 98, at 15 (noting that population of Freetown increased
substantially by 1850s).
101. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 23 (stating that Freetown became Crown Colony
in 1808); CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 31 (maintaining that British
established Crown Colony in Sierra Leone in 1808); CARTWRIGHT, supra note 98, at 18-
19 (reporting that British took over governing of Freetown region from Sierra Leone
Company and that society in Freetown emerged as distinctly Creole); KiLSON, supra
note 92, at 2 (noting that Freetown area became Crown Colony in 1808); Kup, supra
note 98, at 37 (claiming that people of Freetown became British subjects when area
became Crown Colony).
102. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 40 (reporting that British
established Protectorate over interior of Sierra Leone in 1896 over protest of Creole
representatives on impropriety of Protectorate declaration); KiLSON, supra note 92, at
14 (claiming that British expanded their control in effort to gain access to Sierra Le-
one's resources); Kup, supra note 98, at 37, 47 (noting difference between British
Crown Colony and Protectorate and stating that British administered Protectorate dif-
ferently from Colony).
103. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DixoN-FiLE, supra note 1, at 75 (stating that Sierra
Leone received independence in 1961); Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 25, 29
(commenting that Sierra Leone achieved independence in 1961).
104. See HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that Sierra Leone had democracy in
early 1960s); Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 30-31 (claiming that elections in
Sierra Leone in 1962 and 1967 were free and fair).
105. See CONrTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FiLE, supra note 1, at 69 (claiming that All Peo-
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1967,06 and he established a one party state in 1978.107 In 1985,
Stevens handed power over to his chosen successor, Major Gen-
eral Joseph Saidu Momoh.' 0
The civil war in Sierra Leone started in 1991 as an at-
tempted coup d'etat by the Revolutionary United FrontuY
("RUF").110 The RUF never clearly expressed the political objec-
tives of the insurgency.' Fighting continued in Sierra Leone
pie's Congress became principle opposition to Sierra Leone People's Party, dominant
party in Sierra Leone before independence and ruling party from 1962 until 1967);
Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 29 (stating that All People's Congress represented
mostly northern people in Sierra Leone and was led by Siaka Stevens); HIRSCH, supra
note 1, at 25 (noting that All People's Congress drew support from Temnes and
Limbas, groups in north of Sierra Leone).
106. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 79-80 (examining Ste-
vens's assumption of power in 1967); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 29 (claiming that Stevens
was elected in 1967 and despite series of coups and counters that followed, Stevens was
sworn in as prime minister in 1968); Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 31 (maintain-
ing that Stevens assumed position of prime minister in 1967).
107. See Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 32-33 (describing Stevens's consoli-
dation of government into one party state); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 29 (noting estab-
lishment of one party state and claiming that people who opposed imposition of one
party state were executed, exiled, or reduced to poverty); CONTEH-MORGAN & DIxON-
FYLE, supra note 1, at 80-81 (reporting that Stevens established one party state in 1978).
108. See Hayward & Kandeh, supra note 93, at 35 (claiming that many were sur-
prised by Stevens's choice of Momoh as successor); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 30 (assert-
ing that only reason for Momoh's appointment as new prime minister was that he was
extremely loyal to Stevens).
109. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 127 (stating that RUF
insurgents claimed to be freedom fighters working for liberation of Sierra Leone);
HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 31 (asserting that RUF agenda appeared to be populist and
directed against government officials that squandered Sierra Leone's resources); Van
Niekerk, supra note 12, at 19 (claiming that RUF recruits are mostly unemployed and
young people); Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 173-77 (explaining composition of
RUF forces).
110. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXoN-FYLE, supra note 1, at 126-27 (noting that initial
fighting in 1991 was spillover from conflict in neighboring country, Liberia); HIRSCH,
supra note 1, at 31 (asserting that Liberian warlord and now president, Charles Taylor,
was instrumental in organizing coup); Zarate, supra note 19, at 95 (stating that RUF has
been fighting against government since 1991).
111. See CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra note 1, at 135 (claiming that RUF
never pronounced any long term political objectives); Van Niekerk, supra note 12, at 19
(asserting that Sankoh has no political ideology); Schuler, supra note 12, at 7 (reporting
that RUF never engaged in ideological discussion but simply aimed to seize power by
any means); Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (asserting that RUF has no political plat-
form); Brown, supra note 13, at 3 (asserting that conflict in Sierra Leone is not based on
political ideology but rather on gaining private control over wealth); 60 Minutes, supra
note 12, at 20 (noting Bob Simon reporting that RUF has no political aim beyond
complete control of diamond mines in Sierra Leone).
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throughout the 1990s 1 2 and, in May 1999, the RUF and the Si-
erra Leone government signed a cease-fire agreement called the
Lom6 Peace Accord. 1 3
Under the peace agreement terms, Foday Sankoh, the
leader of the RUF, became Chairman of the Commission on the
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction
and Development,114 which officially gave him control over the
diamond mines that his forces were already controlling." 5 Addi-
tionally, the Lom6 agreement granted Sankoh and his insurgent
fighters amnesty for their crimes.116 Violence continues in Si-
112. See Hawley, supra note 16 (reporting that civil war in Sierra Leone has contin-
ued since 1991); Orr, supra note 1, at 14 (claiming that RUF continued fighting even
after it signed ceasefire agreement in 1996); James Rupert, War-Weary, Peace-Wary: Recal-
ling Past Atrocities, Sierra Leoneans Uneasy about Return of Rebels to Capital, WASH. POST,July
18, 1999, at A23 (stating that conflict in Sierra Leone has been ongoing for majority of
1990s); HRW-Sierra Leone: Background, supra note 1 (asserting that RUF fighters have
consistently battled to overthrow successive governments of Sierra Leone throughout
1990s).
113. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revo-
lutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, available at http://www.rufp.org/
Documents/lomepeace-accord/lome-peace-accord.htm [hereinafter Lomfe Peace
Agreement] (calling for ceasefire between RUF and government forces). See generally
HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 71-84 (explaining negotiations of Lom6 Peace Agreement be-
tween RUF and government).
114. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 7(1) (stating that Commis-
sion on Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Develop-
ment is charged with "securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra
Leone's gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic
importance for national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation
and reconstruction").
115. See Lome Peace Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 5(2) (establishing that
Sankoh would assume position as Chairman of Commission on the Management of
Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development); see also Dickey, supra
note 15, at 10 (claiming that Lom6 Peace Agreement placed Sankoh in position as
Chairman of Commission on the Management of Strategic Resources, National Recon-
struction and Development and alleging that despite this appointment, he continues to
engage in illegal diamond mining); Vo, supra note 14, at 7 (asserting that appointment
of Sankoh as government officer destined peace agreement for failure); Schuler, supra
note 12, at 7 (maintaining that Sankoh's position controlling diamonds for government
is ironic); Coll, supra note 1, at W13 (asserting that granting Sankoh official control
over Sierra Leone's diamonds is victory for RUF insurgents); Crossette, supra note 17, at
14 (alleging that although Sankoh assumed position in government, he continued to
trade diamonds illegally); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 50 (stating that Sankoh's
RUF forces already controlled majority of diamond mines in Sierra Leone before
Sankoh's appointment to government post).
116. See Lome Peace Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 9(1)-(2) (stating, in part,
that the "Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corpo-
ral Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon [and] shall also grant absolute and free
pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by
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erra Leone' 17 and the peace agreement has broken down.118
The U.N. is establishing a war crimes tribunal for Sierra Leone
since the failure of the Lom6 agreement.'19
b. Two Months Salary: Funding a Civil War
During the 1990s, RUF forces controlled the major dia-
mond mines in Sierra Leone.1 20  Commentators discuss that
some RUF fighters were illicit diamond miners and traders
before becoming combatants. 121 Some observers speculate that
control of the diamond mines in Sierra Leone is an important
them in pursuit of their objectives"); Harden, supra note 14, at Al (stating that Lom6
Peace Agreement grants RUF insurgents amnesty); Dickey, supra note 15, at 10 (claim-
ing that agreement provided amnesty for all RUF insurgents); Vo, supra note 14, at 7
(reporting that human rights advocates denounced Lom6 Peace Agreement's grant of
amnesty for RUF insurgents); Chris McGreal, Guerilla Rivals Split Over Spoils of War:
Rebels Two Leaders Fight for Control of Diamond Trade, GUARDIAN, May 12, 2000, at 4 (ex-
plaining that RUF soldiers received blanket amnesty for their crimes).
117. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming that RUF insurgents violated peace
agreement by attacking villages, burning homes, sexually assaulting women, and ab-
ducting children); HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 109 (claiming that RUF violations of peace
agreement discredit their sincerity in seeking peace); Vo, supra note 14, at 7 (asserting
that insurgents in Sierra Leone attacked strategic town of Masiaka on May 14, 2000);
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone Rebels Violating Peace Accord (Oct.
27, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/oct/sierraO27.htm (ex-
pressing concern about recent violence in Sierra Leone).
118. See War's Best Friend, supra note 13 (stating that peace deal has disintegrated
with return of violence); Farah, supra note 4, at Al (reporting recent exchange of gun-
fire between British and RUF troops as sign of demise of peace accord). See generally
HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 84-90 (explaining collapse of Lom4 Peace Agreement).
119. See Press Release, United Nations, Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary-Gen-
eral for Legal Affairs (Oct. 5, 2000) (stating that U.N. and Sierra Leone government are
in talks about measures necessary to establish court for prosecution of war crimes);
Bruce Zagaris, U.N. Security Council Votes to Establish War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone,
16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 978, 978 No. 10 (Oct. 2000) (claiming that Security
Council voted unanimously to establish tribunal for war crimes committed by insurgent
forces in Sierra Leone); Barbara Crossette, U.N. To Establish a War Crimes Tribunal To
Hear Sierra Leone Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2000, at A6 (noting that Security Council
resolution to establish Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal did not actually establish tribu-
nal or decide composition or procedures of court).
120. See Vo, supra note 14, at 7 (claiming that RUF forces have controlled diamond
mines for long time); MacAskill, supra note 96, at 4 (asserting that most of diamond
mines in Sierra Leone are under RUF control); Zarate, supra note 19, at 95 (maintain-
ing that RUF occupied valuable diamond territory in early 1990s); SMILLIE ET AL., supra
note 19, at 50 (claiming that RUF controlled major diamond mining areas at time of
Lom6 Peace Agreement); see also HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 25 (claiming that RUF gener-
ated between US$300,000,000 and US$450,000,000 worth of diamonds annually in
1990s); Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 5 (estimating that Sierra Leone
insurgents produced US$70,000,000 worth of diamonds in 1999).
121. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 179 (claiming that RUF recruited
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underlying reason for the insurgency. 122 On July 6, 2000, the
U.N. Security Council imposed an embargo on diamonds from
Sierra Leone. 123 This resolution called on nations to take all
necessary measures to prevent direct or indirect importation of
diamonds from Sierra Leone that are not officially certified by
the Sierra Leone government.1 24
C. De Beers: Diamonds Scar Forever
Corporate actors facilitate the conflict diamond trade by
buying illicit diamonds directly or indirectly from insurgent
groups. 125  De Beers's control of the diamond trade makes its
involvement with conflict diamonds particularly relevant.126 For
alienated youth who had become illicit diamond miners); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19,
at 50 (noting that RUF is dominated by former illicit diamond miners).
122. See Crossette, supra note 8, at Al (claiming that diamonds are problem be-
hind war in Sierra Leone); O'Loughlin, supra note 13, at 25 (maintaining that RUF's
main goal is control of diamond mines); Rupert, supra note 112, at A23 (noting that
RUF forces have been fighting for control of Sierra Leone's diamond and gold mines);
60 Minutes, supra note 12, at 20 (noting Bob Simon claiming RUF has no political objec-
tive and asserting that control of diamond mines motivates insurgent group); HRW-
Sierra Leone: Background, supra note 1 (asserting that RUF's aim is access to diamond
mines). One report indicates that the insurgents focused their efforts on controlling
diamond producing areas at the start of the war. CONTEH-MORGAN & DIXON-FYLE, supra
note 1, at 127. Some commentators allege that these wars continue because the profits
increase as law and order disintegrate. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 13, at 192
(noting that conflict continues because diamond trade provides financial security to
insurgents); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 10, 12 (claiming that war in Sierra Leone
revolves around profit from diamond trade); see also Claudia McElroy, Rich Pickings But
Empty Coffers in Sierra Leone, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 1996, at 10 (claiming that government
officials in Sierra Leone also profit from illicit mining and trade in diamonds). See
generally Collier, supra note 13 (asserting that fighting will continue when insurgents
profit financially from conflict).
123. See S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 4168th mtg., at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306
(2000) (expressing concern over role of illegal diamond sales in funding insurgent war
effort in Sierra Leone).
124. See id. at para. 1 (mandating that countries should refuse to import diamonds
from Sierra Leone).
125. See Crossette, supra note 17, at 14 (reporting that conflict diamond trade is
linked to international traders and markets in Antwerp); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19,
at 13, 15 (explaining role of private industry in sustaining civil wars by engaging in
trade with insurgent forces with no enforceable regulations on trade).
126. See Collier, supra note 15, at Al (stating that De Beers has responsibility as
industry leader to ensure that diamonds do not come from conflict zones); Julie Fla-
herty, A Diamond Stockpile That is Not Forever, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, at 11 (claiming
that De Beers's control of diamond trade has created considerable pressure on com-
pany to halt conflict diamond trade); Rocks That Kill, supra note 15, at 42 (claiming that
De Beers bought diamonds from UNITA but then reluctantly complied with U.N. sanc-
tions); De Beers and Africa's Crisis, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at 24 (maintaining that De
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years, De Beers has set the price of diamonds for the entire dia-
mond industry by acquiring the majority of diamonds before
they reach the market. 127 De Beers is able to acquire these
diamonds both through its own mining activities and by purchas-
ing diamonds from sellers outside the organization.1 28 Although
De Beers no longer operates any buying activities in Angola or
Sierra Leone, 129 commentators claim that the organization ac-
quires diamonds from these areas by buying from outside deal-
ers.' 30 De Beers has recently guaranteed that their diamonds do
not originate in conflict areas. 1 '
1. Corporate Structure
De Beers is a corporation controlled by the Oppenheimer
family. 132 Commentators note that De Beers's corporate struc-
Beers should lead effort to ban conflict diamonds); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 23-
24, 28 (describing De Beers's domination of diamond industry and asserting that De
Beers's consistent control makes their participation in conflict diamond trade likely).
127. See Montpelier, supra note 20, at 289 (noting that De Beers controls both
supply and demand in effort to keep price of diamonds high); Romesh Ratnesar, A Gem
of a New Strategy, TIME, Sept. 25, 2000, at B18, B18 (maintaining that De Beers tries to
mine or buy all diamonds in world); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (quoting De Beers
buyer who claimed that De Beers would buy from anyone in order to keep diamond
prices stable).
128. See DE BEERS, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, at 37 (2000) (stating that De Beers deals
in diamonds from its own mines in South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana and also
purchases diamonds from Russian and Canadian partners); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note
19, at 23 (claiming that De Beers obtains diamonds from its own mines through part-
nerships with government controlled mines in Botswana, Namibia, and Tanzania and
through purchases from outside market).
129. See DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 14 (claiming that De Beers has shut down all
of its outside buying offices in Africa).
130. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 163, 181 (asserting that several
diamond dealers, who traded with De Beers, also traded with UNITA for diamonds);
Duffield, supra note 17, at 28 (asserting that De Beers obtained diamonds from UNITA,
making no inquiry about origin of diamonds); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (al-
leging that De Beers acquires diamonds that have been smuggled out of Sierra Leone).
131. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Briefing, Africa: Gemocide, June 20,
2000, at http://www.eiu.com/latest/363867.asp (reporting De Beers's announcement
that it will require written contracts with buyers to guarantee that De Beers diamonds
do not originate in conflict zones); Alan Cowell, Controversy Over Diamonds Made Into
Virtue by De Beers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that De Beers recast its
position in diamond industry by guaranteeing that its diamonds would not originate in
conflict areas).
132. See Montpelier, supra note 20, at 285 (stating that De Beers owes its corporate
structure to its long time leader, Ernest Oppenheimer, and his son, Harry Oppen-
heimer); Cowell & Swarns, supra note 20, at W1 (reporting that Oppenheimer family
has run De Beers since 1920s, with Nicky Oppenheimer, grandson of Ernest Oppen-
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ture is complex. 133 For the past decade, two closely related pub-
lic companies, De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited, incorpo-
rated in South Africa, and De Beers Centenary AG, incorporated
in Switzerland, have controlled the De Beers syndicate. 134 In ad-
dition to these two large corporations, the De Beers syndicate
controls many other subsidiary companies.1 35 Prior to February
2001, De Beers maintained a thirty-five percent interest in the
Anglo American Corporation, a large mining company.'3 6 Some
observers have criticized De Beers's corporate structure as lack-
ing transparency.
137
De Beers recently announced its decision to change its orga-
nizational form and create a new private company with Anglo
heimer, as current chairman of De Beers). See generally KANFER, supra note 20, at 206-
374 (examining Oppenheimer leadership of De Beers).
133. See KANFER, supra note 20, at 5 (claiming that De Beers's extensive organiza-
tion presides over 1,300 businesses); Montpelier, supra note 20, at 285 (stating that De
Beers is complex corporate group).
134. See Anglo American: Diamonds, supra note 20 (stating that De Beers was di-
vided into two main companies in 1990 based in South Africa and Switzerland); see also
DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 71-103, 105-34 (reporting on activities of De Beers Consoli-
dated Mines Limited and De Beers Centenary AG in 1999); Montpelier, supra note 20,
at 285-86 (reporting that despite split between South African and Swiss companies, they
retain close relationship, sharing board of directors and annual reports).
135. See Montpelier, supra note 20, at 286 (reporting that De Beers controls or has
substantial interests in many subsidiary companies); Press Release, Interim Results, De
Beers (Aug. 16, 2000) (announcing De Beers recent move to acquire interest in other
companies); Terry Macalister, Storm Breaks over Pounds 12bn Bid for De Beers: Disgruntled
Shareholders Accuse Anglo American and Oppenheimer Family of Conflicts of Interest and Lack of
Information, GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 2001, at 29 (claiming that recent agreement between
Anglo American and De Beers to become private organization is complicated by nu-
merous cross holdings between two companies).
136. See Anglo American: Diamonds, supra note 20 (stating that De Beers owns
35% of Anglo American); DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 70 (claiming that De Beers owns
35.4% of Anglo American); see also Nicholas Stein, A New Cut on an Old Monopoly, FoR-
TUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 186, 191 (asserting that cross-holdings between De Beers and
Anglo American were originally designed to secure trading arrangements with coun-
tries that refused to trade with South Africa during apartheid era). Anglo American is a
mining company based in London. See Gillian O'Connor, 'There's Gold in Them There
Streets', FIN. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at 28 (noting that Anglo American is mining company
with significant ties to De Beers). Harry Oppenheimer controlled Anglo American Cor-
poration before he became involved with De Beers. See KANFER, supra note 20, at 180-84
(examining establishment of Anglo American Corporation in 1917); EPSTEIN, supra
note 20, at 81 (stating that Oppenheimer formed Anglo American in 1917).
137. See Cowell & Swarns, supra note 20, at W1 (asserting that critics have called
relationship between De Beers and Anglo American secretive); Montpelier, supra note
20, at 287-88 (claiming that it is impossible to know how many companies De Beers
controls and that De Beers's complex organizational structure presents serious
problems for law enforcement).
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American.1 31 Under the new arrangement, a consortium called
DB Investments, with most shares controlled by the Oppen-
heimer family and Anglo American, will buy out De Beers share-
holders.139 Although the new company will be private, repre-
sentatives claim that De Beers will not retreat into secrecy.14
2. Buying Habits
De Beers controls about sixty percent of the world's uncut
diamond sales.141 De Beers has recognized its past position as
"custodian of the market, '142 and commentators note that this
role has led to a policy of buying all of the diamonds on the
market in an effort to control and stabilize the price of
diamonds.'4 3  De Beers recently announced its intention to
138. See Cowell & Swarns, supra note 20, at WI (reporting that De Beers and Anglo
American plan to become one private organization); Macalister, supra note 135, at 29
(reporting announcement that Anglo American will buy out De Beers shareholders).
139. See Cowell & Swarns, supra note 20, at W1 (stating that Oppenheimer family
and Anglo American will each have forty five percent stake in DB Investments and Deb-
swana, controlled jointly by De Beers and Botswanan government, will have ten percent
stake).
140. See Cowell & Swarns, supra note 20, at WI (quoting assurances of representa-
tives of Anglo American and De Beers and noting that critics claim De Beers will not be
as open as when it was public); Macalister, supra note 135, at 29 (stating that critics fear
new private status of De Beers will make company's activities even more difficult to
monitor).
141. See DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 34 (stating that De Beers controlled about
two thirds of world diamond supply in 1999); Anglo American: Diamonds, supra note
20 (asserting that De Beers sorts, values, and markets about 60% of all rough
diamonds); Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 1 (claiming that De Beers
controls 65% of world diamond production); see also SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 22
(noting that De Beers controls majority of world's diamonds and sets price of diamonds
on global market). De Beers recently entered into a venture with France's LVMH lux-
ury goods group. See Pretzlik, supra note 22, at 1 (stating that agreement will expand
De Beers's involvement in diamond industry to retail jewelry sales).
142. See DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 12-13 (claiming that De Beers's role as custo-
dian of market must adjust with changing times); Interview by Martin Rapaport with
Nicky Oppenheimer, supra note 47 (explaining De Beers's recent decision to refrain
from controlling supply and instead drive demand).
143. See Ratnesar, supra note 127, at B18 (claiming that De Beers attempted to
mine or buy all diamonds in world); Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (quoting De Beers
buyer who claimed that De Beers would buy from anyone in order to maintain stable
market); see also 60 Minutes, supra note 12, at 21 (noting Bob Simon asserting that De
Beers bought conflict diamonds in effort to keep diamond prices stable); DE BEERS,
supra note 128, at 12 (explaining that De Beers's role in past has been to act as custo-
dian of market, managing supply in order protect diamond prices from volatility of
demand).
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abandon its policy of acquiring all diamonds on the market.1 44
Before its change in policy, De Beers obtained diamonds
both through production from its own mines and from outside
markets, also known as the open market.145 De Beers does not
operate any mines in conflict areas,146 thus, if De Beers obtains
conflict diamonds, the company acquires them through the
outside market buying process.147 This system creates problems
of accountability because there are a number of intermediaries
involved. 4 ' In the past, when a government has been unable to
144. See Flaherty, supra note 126, at 11 (reporting that De Beers has plans to re-
duce its stockpile of diamonds and strengthen demand for diamonds through market-
ing strategies); A. Gary Shilling, Diamonds Aren't Forever, FORBES, Sept. 18, 2000, at 266,
266 (claiming that De Beers's announcement that they would no longer monopolize
supply of diamonds was significant event); see also DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 13 (ex-
plaining De Beers's intention to begin selling off stockpile and redefine its role in dia-
mond industry in accordance with changing times). Shortly before De Beers's an-
nouncement that it would reduce its stockpile in June 2000, De Beers declared that it
would no longer trade in conflict diamonds. See Flaherty, supra note 126, at 11 (stating
that De Beers also guaranteed that its diamonds would not originate in conflict zones);
Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 131 (stating that De Beers announced decision
to refrain from buying conflict diamonds in June 2000).
145. See Collier, supra note 15, at Al (stating that diamonds sold on open market
are those that do not come from De Beers's own mines); DE BEERS, supra note 128, at
37 (stating that De Beers produced diamonds from its own mines in South Africa,
Namibia, and Botswana and also bought diamonds from Russian and Canadian part-
ners). But see Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 1 (claiming that outside
market buying process constituted only five percent of De Beers's total intake in past
decade). Diamonds from the outside market are diamonds that do not originate in
mines owned or controlled by De Beers. See SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 22 (claim-
ing that outside market buying consists of acquiring diamonds through non-De Beers
sources); see also Smith, supra note 20, at 18 (asserting that outside market buying pro-
cess includes buying from small Angolan dealers as well as dealers in London and Ant-
werp); Collier, supra note 15, atAl (claiming that De Beers's announcement that it will
not deal in conflict diamonds means that it will limit its outside market buying to places
such as Russia and Australia where it does not have mines); Block, supra note 41, at 4
(maintaining that De Beers would buy diamonds from virtually anyone in order to pre-
serve its control of diamond trade).
146. See Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 1 (stating that De Beers's
mines are in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Tanzania).
147. See Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 7 (acknowledging that De
Beers bought Angolan diamonds on open market during war time in Angola); KosKow,
supra note 31, at 151 (claiming that while some legitimate transactions are conducted
on open market, most deals on open market are for smuggled diamonds); SMILLIE ET
AL., supra note 19, at 28 (maintaining that De Beers's connection to diamonds from
Sierra Leone is indirect).
148. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 197 (asserting that open markets
make laundering diamonds easier); Collier, supra note 15, at A] (claiming that smug-
glers take diamonds from conflict areas to sell them in larger cities on open market
with false registration information); De Beers and the CSO, supra note 22 (maintaining
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effectively prevent smuggling, experts argue that De Beers know-
ingly bought diamonds from smugglers or other third parties in
order to maintain its control over the supply of diamonds.
149
3. Rules of Engagement
De Beers's involvement with diamonds from Angola and Si-
erra Leone reflects their old policy of acquiring the majority of
diamonds produced in world in an effort to keep the diamond
supply steady and diamond prices stable.15 ° De Beers bought
diamonds from Angola in the 1990s when UNITA occupied
most diamond mines in the country.' Additionally, commenta-
tors assert that De Beers acquired diamonds from Sierra Leone
through outside dealers. 152
a. Angola
Commentators state that De Beers openly bought diamonds
that presence of multiple intermediaries makes tracing origin of diamonds very diffi-
cult).
149. See KoSKOFF, supra note 31, at 159 (claiming that De Beers's objective was
simply to control flow of all diamonds, legal or illegal, by cooperating with government
authorities when appropriate and working with smugglers when necessary); EPSTEIN,
supra note 20, at 147-56 (asserting that De Beers deliberately engaged in illicit diamond
trade with smugglers from Sierra Leone and Angola in 1960s and 1970s); see also U.N.
Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 163 (stating that De Beers acquired diamonds from
UNITA-held territories in Angola through De Decker brothers, who set up sales system
for UNITA diamonds in 1993); De Beers and the CSO, supra note 22 (maintaining that De
Beers has buyers in transit countries for smuggled diamonds). Furthermore, a U.N.
report claims that De Beers often re-exports its diamonds through Switzerland in order
to take advantage of Swiss tax laws. U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 198. This
practice means that many of the diamonds imported into London by De Beers are said
to originate in Switzerland rather than their true country of origin. U.N. Final Report,
supra. The British government requested that De Beers cease this practice, but De
Beers continues to engage in this process of re-exportation. Id.
150. See, e.g., Drogin, supra note 13, at Al (quoting De Beers buyer who asserted
that De Beers would buy from any seller in order to prevent non-De Beers diamonds
from reaching market and to keep diamond prices stable).
151. See Rocks That Kill, supra note 15, at 42 (stating that De Beers bought UNITA
diamonds during 1990s); Matloff, supra note 59, at 1 (asserting that De Beers spent
between US$500,000,000 and US$800,000,000 on UNITA diamonds between 1992 and
1993); Honigsbaum & Gordon, supra note 47, at 23 (stating that De Beers acknowl-
edged its involvement in buying UNITA diamonds off open market before imposition
of U.N. sanctions on trade with UNITA).
152. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming that De Beers indirectly bought
diamonds from Sierra Leone during time when RUF controlled diamond mines); SML-
LIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (asserting that it is incredible that De Beers has not
bought Sierra Leone diamonds given its buying habits).
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that originated in Angola in the 1990s, when the UNITA forces
controlled the large majority of the diamond mines in the coun-
try." Such individuals conclude that De Beers was engaged in
trade with UNITA insurgents and thereby provided funds to
combatants, who perpetuated strife in the region.1" 4 The United
Nations also reports that De Beers was involved in the Angolan
conflict diamond trade.15 In the late 1990s, De Beers re-
sponded with a decision to refrain from buying Angolan
diamonds.
156
153. See Rocks That Kill, supra note 15, at 42 (stating that De Beers spent
US$40,000,000 per month in effort to buy up UNITA diamonds); Matloff, supra note
59, at 1 (claiming that De Beers bought between US$500,000,000 and US$800,000,000
worth of diamonds from UNITA controlled mines between 1992 and 1993); Honig-
sbaum & Gordon, supra note 47, at 23 (stating that De Beers admitted to buying UNITA
diamonds off open market before U.N. imposed sanctions on trade with UNITA);
HRW-ANGoLA, supra note 13, at 58 (asserting that De Beers admitted to spending
US$500,000,000 to buy legal and illegal diamonds from Angola on open market);
Ratnesar, supra note 127, at B18 (stating that De Beers bought US$14,000,000 in
diamonds from UNITA); Francesco Guerrera et al., Special Report: De Beers: All that
Glitters is Not Sold, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at 16 (claiming that De Beers bought ille-
gally mined diamonds from UNITA in 1992 while UNITA simultaneously engaged in
peace talks with government). But see Hearing on Conflict Diamonds, supra note 32, at 7
(claiming that while De Beers admits to buying diamonds from Angola on open market
during 1990s, it never bought diamonds directly from UNITA).
154. See CIMENT, supra note 50, at 72 (maintaining that UNITA had secret arrange-
ment with Anglo American to sell diamonds); Duffield, supra note 17, at 28 (asserting
that De Beers obtained diamonds from UNITA, asking no questions about origin of
diamonds).
155. See U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 163, 181 (asserting that several
major clients of De Beers traded with UNITA for diamonds); see also U.N. Exposes Angola
Diamond Trade, supra note 17 (claiming that U.N. report called on De Beers to take
responsibility for its role in conflict diamond trade).
156. See DE BEERS, supra note 128, at 14 (claiming that De Beers has been steadfast
in observance of U.N. sanctions against Angola and has gone beyond legal require-
ments by guaranteeing that it will not buy any Angolan diamonds, even those with offi-
cial government certificates, until Angola is stable); Press Release, Global Witness, Cau-
tious Welcome for De Beers Angolan Diamond Embargo (Oct. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/press/pr_991005.html [hereinafter Cautious
Welcome] (reporting DeBeers' announcement that it will no longer buy unofficial
Angolan diamonds); see also Nicholas Shaxson, De Beers Negotiates Rights with Angola:
Talks Could Lead to the Re-establishment of the Company as Local Participant, Allowing It to
Take on the AscorpJoint Venture, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000, at 44 (claiming that De Beers's
decision to stop buying unofficial Angolan diamonds was result of pressure to end trade
in conflict diamonds); Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 131 (noting that De
Beers may actually benefit from public backlash because it is only company with ability
to guarantee that diamonds are not from conflict zones).
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b. Sierra Leone
Experts discuss that De Beers's involvement in conflict
diamonds from Sierra Leone is linked with smuggling into Libe-
ria.15 Liberia has few diamond mines within its own borders
and is a transit country for Sierra Leone diamonds.1"8 De Beers
asserts that their offices in Sierra Leone and Liberia have been
closed for fourteen years.1 59 Commentators allege that it is con-
ceivable that De Beers bought illicit Sierra Leone diamonds
through intermediaries given De Beers's policy of buying from




In June 2000, De Beers announced its intention to sign for-
mal written contracts with its trading partners to ensure that
157. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9-10 (noting that diamonds from Sierra Leone
are usually smuggled into Liberia or other neighboring countries and that recent fight-
ing in Liberia has disrupted this normal trade route); SMILIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 6
(claiming that Liberian connection to conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone has existed
since beginning of war). Commentators allege that throughout the civil war, Liberia
has been an active supporter of the RUF, providing arms as well as funds, seemingly in
exchange for stolen diamonds from the RUF. Id. at 49 (asserting that Liberia has ex-
ported large amounts of diamonds that are suspected to have originally come from
Sierra Leone); Norimitsu Onishi, Africa Diamond Hub Defies Smuggling Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2001, at Al (maintaining that Liberian President, Charles Taylor, backed Sierra
Leone rebels, gaining diamonds in exchange for providing arms to forces); Harden,
supra note 14, at Al (claiming that most Sierra Leone diamonds are smuggled into
Liberia for sale); McGreal, supra note 116, at 4 (asserting that Liberian President,
Charles Taylor, has been RUF's chief sponsor); Buchan et al., supra note 14, at 6 (not-
ing that RUF smugglers received assistance from Liberian President, Charles Taylor, in
diamond trade).
158. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that Liberia is key route for Sierra
Leone diamonds to reach consumer market); Kiley, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that
Sierra Leone diamonds are smuggled into Liberia and that Liberia has virtually no
diamonds); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 49 (asserting that Liberia has negligible
diamond production of its own and has become fencing nation). The U.N. Security
Council recently voted to impose sanctions on Liberia for its participation in trading
arms for diamonds from Sierra Leone. See Barbara Crossette, Behave or Face a Diamond
Ban, Security Council Tells Liberians, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001, at A6 (noting that Security
Council voted unanimously to ban imports of Liberian diamonds if Liberia continues to
support RUF).
159. Press Release, De Beers, Angolan Diamond (Oct. 5, 1999).
160. See Dickey, supra note 15, at 9 (claiming that De Beers likely bought diamonds
from Sierra Leone indirectly); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (asserting that it is
inconceivable that De Beers has avoided buying Sierra Leone diamonds given its buying
habits).
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their diamonds do not originate in conflict zones. 16 1 The World
Diamond Council, composed of the industry's two largest
groups, also committed itself to ending the trade in conflict
diamonds by setting up a global system of identification for all
diamonds on the market. 62 These steps to reform the industry
are in response to an increase in public awareness about this is-
sue. 1
63
II. MULTI-FACETED APPROACHES TO
CORPORATE LIABILITY
With the increased influence of MNCs in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, international organizations, national poli-
161. See Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 131 (reporting De Beers's an-
nouncement that it will sign written contracts with buyers to guarantee that De Beers
diamonds do not come from conflict areas); De Beers and Africa's Crisis, supra note 126
(reporting De Beers's decision to guarantee that its diamonds are not conflict
diamonds and noting that any effort to reform industry must begin with De Beers be-
cause it controls majority of diamond trade); Cowell, supra note 131, at Al (observing
that De Beers redefined its position in diamond industry by guaranteeing that its
diamonds would not originate in conflict zones). But see U.N. Final Report, supra note
15, at para. 199 (acknowledging that it is difficult to validate whether De Beers is com-
plying with its pledge not to buy conflict diamonds because there is no external moni-
toring system). In the same announcement, De Beers called for a uniform standard for
identifying diamonds according to their origin. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra
note 131; see also U.N. Final Report, supra note 15, at para. 199 (expressing concern that
although De Beers has closed many of its African buying offices, it is impossible to verify
whether De Beers continues to buy conflict diamonds through its buying offices in Eu-
rope). Although De Beers has guaranteed that it will no longer trade in conflict
diamonds, it does not account for the diamonds that are already in its stockpile. See 60
Minutes, supra note 12, at 21 (noting Bob Simon stating that De Beers's guarantee that
it will no longer trade in conflict diamonds does not ensure that diamonds already in its
possession are not from conflict zones).
162. See African Diamonds: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Trade of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 47-49 (2000) (text of Joint Resolution World Federation of
Diamond Bourses and International Diamond Manufacturers Association) (proposing
that every country that imports diamonds enact legislation requiring that every im-
ported parcel of diamonds be "sealed and registered in a universally standardized man-
ner by an accredited export authority from the exporting country"); Diamond Traders
Act, supra note 17, at C21 (stating that World Diamond Council plans to establish com-
puterized global registry for diamonds); Diamond Leaders in Pact, supra note 14 (report-
ing that decision by International Diamond Manufactures Association and World Feder-
ation of Diamond Bourses was arrived at during World Diamond Congress in July
2000).
163. See Diamond Traders Act, supra note 17, atC21 (noting that since U.N. imposed
sanctions on Sierra Leone diamonds, diamond industry has been developing strategies
to assure consumers that diamonds do not come from conflict zones). But see Cowell,
supra note 131, at Al (observing that De Beers decision to refrain from buying conflict
diamonds had economic as well as moral motives).
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ticians, and private actors have developed various techniques for
holding MNCs accountable. 16 4 In the past decade, private indi-
viduals have invoked the ATCA as a method for demanding cor-
porate responsibility for human rights violations. 165 More tradi-
tionally, international organizations, the United States, and pri-
vate industry initiatives have developed codes of conduct to
guide MNCs in their activities abroad.166 Although these efforts
are meaningful for drawing attention to the need for corporate
accountability, no court has found an MNC liable under the
ATCA1 67 and codes of conduct are generally voluntary and rarely
164. See, e.g., Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 15 I.L.M. 969-70, annex
(1976) [hereinafter OECD Declaration] (creating guidelines for MNCs operating outside
their home nation); Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy, International Labour Organization, 17 I.L.M. 422, 425-28 (1978)
[hereinafter Tripartite Declaration] (establishing labor standards for MNCs); Development
and International Economic Cooperation: Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d sess.,
Agenda Item 7(d), para. 14, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) [hereinafter Draft U.N. Code]
(claiming that MNCs should observe human rights standards); U.S. Department of
Commerce, Model Business Principles, available at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/
telearn/global/ilo/guide/usmodel.htm [hereinafter Model Principles] (encouraging
MNCs to adopt codes of conduct reflecting respect for fundamental human rights); The
Sullivan Statement of Principles (4th Amplification), Nov. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M 1496 (1985)
[hereinafter Sullivan Principles] (creating guidelines for MNCs operating in South Af-
rica during apartheid); Irish National Caucus, The MacBride Principles, at http://
www.knight-hub.com/inc/MacBride.html (establishing code of conduct for MNCs op-
erating in Northern Ireland); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir.
2000) (allowing suit against oil MNC operating in Nigeria to proceed under Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA") where allegations concerned human rights abuses related to its
business activities there); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 374
(E.D. La. 1997) (examining plaintiff's effort to apply ATCA to MNC operating in Indo-
nesia); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing that ATCA
could apply to large oil MNC with respect to human rights abuses associated with pro-
ject in Myanmar).
165. See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 101 (applying ATCA in case against MNC operating
in Nigeria for human rights abuses related to its activities); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374
(invoking ATCA to bring suit against MNC operating in Indonesia); Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. at 891-92 (using ATCA to hold MNC accountable for human rights violations
related to oil pipeline project in Myanmar).
166. See OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 972-76 (establishing standards for
MNC activity); Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164, at 425-28 (proposing standards for
treatment of workers by MNCs operating outside their home country); Draft U.N. Code,
supra note 164, at para. 14 (maintaining that MNCs should respect human rights);
Model Principles, supra note 164 (urging MNCs to implement codes of conduct that
require observance of human rights); Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (estab-
lishing standards for MNCs operating in South Africa during apartheid era); Irish Na-
tional Caucus, supra note 164 (creating guidelines for MNCs conducting activities in
Northern Ireland).
167. See, e.g., Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373 (refusing to find MNC liable under
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enforced. 68
A. Alien Tort Claims Act
The ATCA acts as a tool for holding human rights violators
liable to victims seeking redress when options in their own coun-
tries are limited.169 Although the statute is over 200 years old, it
ATCA); Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306-1307 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter
Unocal I1] (granting summary judgment motion of MNC in ATCA case).
168. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corpo-
rations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 172-
73 (1997) (noting that human rights commentators criticize U.S. Model Principles as
being vague, duplicative, and unenforceable); Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Volun-
tary Codes of Ethics in International Markets: Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging
Global Communities, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus, L. 327, 341-42 (1994) (commenting that
Draft U.N. Code and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Dec-
laration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises ("OECD Declara-
tion") lacks requisite specificity to be effectively enforced); Heidi S. Bloomfield, Note,
"Sweating" the International Garment Industry: A Critique of the Presidential Task Force's Work-
place Codes of Conduct and Monitoring System, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 567, 570
(1999) (asserting that lack of enforcement represents fundamental problem with codes
of conduct).
169. ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878,
889 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that court in home country failed to respond to allegations
of torture and holding that State official who tortures individual is liable under ATCA).
A plaintiff from Sierra Leone or Angola seeking redress against De Beers for its involve-
ment in the conflict diamond trade may rely on the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")
because there is no Court of Human Rights in Africa. See Welch, The African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43
(1992), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE, at 828 (Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum eds., 1995) (noting that regional
African human rights system does not have court to complement African Commission
on Human and People's Rights, unlike regional systems in Europe and in Americas).
The U.N. has initiated an effort to set up a tribunal for addressing the war crimes com-
mitted in Sierra Leone, but it has not yet been established. See Zagaris, supra note 119,
at 978 (reporting that Security Council voted unanimously to establish tribunal for
prosecution of Sierra Leone war criminals); Crossette, supra note 119, at A6 (noting
Security Council's decision to set up tribunal for Sierra Leone). The international com-
munity has established tribunals on several occasions to hear allegations of war crimes
and other violations of international law. See generally Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We
Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in International Criminal Law, 15 Am. U. INT'L L. REV.
321 (2000) (reviewing international tribunals established to prosecute war crimes).
Similarly, after the end of apartheid, the South African government set up the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. See Kadar Asmal, Second Annual Grotius Lecture, In-
ternational Law and Practice: Dealing with the Past in the South African Experience, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2000) (claiming that new democracy in South Africa chose to
confront legacy of apartheid through Truth and Reconciliation Commission). These
efforts to publicize and prosecute war crimes have encountered many obstacles in at-
tempting to fulfill their mandates. See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, Conceptualizing Violence: Present
and Future Developments in International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Con-
fronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The Ti-
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existed in relative obscurity until the plaintiffs in Filartiga v. Pena-
Iralat7 ° used it to hold a Paraguayan state official liable for tor-
ture.' 7 ' Since then, plaintiffs have attempted to use the ATCA
against private individuals and MNCs, alleging violations of the
"law of nations."1 72  Nevertheless, plaintiffs utilizing this ap-
proach face many obstacles, making recovery unlikely.173
1. General Background
The ATCA, initially passed as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789,174 grants jurisdiction to U.S. district courts over any civil
action brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of
the "law of nations" 175 or a U.S. treaty. 1 7 6 Commentators specu-
bunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REv. 841, 852-53 (1997) (claiming
that international community has failed to support International Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia); Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice System in Dealing with
the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 180-87 (2000) (examining obstacles to
success of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Adam Roberts, The Laws of
War: Problems ofImplementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 11,
26 (1995) (asserting that Nuremberg Trials were selective and did not reach many war
criminals); Theresa Klosterman, Note, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth Commission
in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 Aniz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 842-44 (noting that
evidence gathered from truth commissions have yet to lead to prosecutions and observ-
ing that truth commissions may have effect of fostering old wounds).
170. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (noting that courts seldom used ATCA in past).
171. See id. at 877-78 (explaining plaintiffs' allegations that Pena-Irala tortured Fi-
lartiga to death).
172. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1005 (1996) (using ATCA to hold private individual liable for crimes of genocide
and war crimes); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374 (examining plaintiffs claim that ATCA
jurisdiction should extend to MNC operating in Indonesia); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (acknowledging legitimacy of ATCA application in
suit against MNC with respect to human rights violations resulting from business activi-
ties in Myanmar).
173. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 121 (explaining that ATCA plaintiffs face strin-
gent factual requirements); Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S.
Alien Tort Claims Act for Violations of Customary International Law During the Third Reich,
1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167, 191, 195-96 (1997) (commenting that
forum non conveniens presents potential reason for U.S. courts not to hear ATCA suit
and examining difficulties posed by personal jurisdiction requirements).
174. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). See generally Anne-
Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 461 (1989) (examining possible history behind passage of ATCA).
175. ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Trial of Gideon Henfield (C.C.D. Pa. 1973), re-
printed in F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS 49, 52-53 (1849) (quoting Chief Justice John Jay
describing "law of nations" as laws that bind nations whether in peacetime or at war); see
also Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights
Suits Against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 145, 152-54 (1999)
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late that the framers of the statute designed the legislation in
order to avoid conflicts with other nations over mistreatment of
non-U.S. citizens. 177 Although commentators hypothesize as to
the possible purpose of this statute, little legislative history exists
to indicate the framers' actual intent.178 For almost 200 years,
courts rarely used the ATCA. 179 This changed in 1980, when the
Second Circuit court relied on the ATCA in the landmark case
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.180
(analyzing requirements for qualification as violating "laws of nations"). See generally
Charles F. Marshall, Development in Immigration Law: Re-framing the Alien Tort Act After
Kadic v. Karadzic, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 591, 605-06 (1996) (asserting that
meaning of "law of nations" has changed over time and that modern day understanding
generally only holds nations, and not individuals, obligated under "law of nations").
The "law of nations" also can be understood as customary international law or univer-
sally recognized principles of law. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAw, POLICY, AND PRAcTmcE 93 (Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum 3d ed., 1995) (com-
menting that customary international law is source of international law); Curtis A. Brad-
ley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421, 422
(2000) (explaining that concept of international law is generally divided into customary
international law and treaties).
176. See ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (stating that "'[t]he district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States").
177. See, e.g., Burley, supra note 174, at 465, 469, 475 (claiming that theories of
intent of statute depict ATCA as effort to protect United States from conflict with other
nations and asserting that framers of statute may have been concerned with denial of
justice to alien in U.S. courts, protection of ambassadors, or nation's duty to enforce
international law); Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Mul-
tinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV.
881, 891-92 (1999) (examining theories of intent of ATCA and claiming that general
purpose was protection of aliens from mistreatment in United States); David P. Kunstle,
Note, Kadic v. Karadzic: Do Private Individuals Have Enforceable Rights and Obligations
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 6 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 319, 324 (1996) (claiming
that legal scholars have examined intellectual climate at time ATCA was passed to deter-
mine rationale for law).
178. See Burley, supra note 174, at 463 (asserting impossibility of obtaining unam-
biguous proof of intended purpose of ATCA); Kunstie, supra note 177, at 324 (claiming
little legislative history for ATCA exists); Kieserman, supra note 177, at 891-92 (noting
lack of clarity in determining originally intended scope of ATCA).
179. See Ariadne K Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They be
Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 927, 938-39 (1998) (opining that courts did not rely on ATCA because they had only
vague understanding of customary international law).
180. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing that
courts had rarely relied on ATCA in past); see also Kunsde, supra note 177, at 326 (as-
serting that Filartiga increased knowledge of ATCA); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking Interna-
tional Human Rights in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 398-99 (1985) (asserting
that Filartiga Court holding that State-sponsored torture violates international law is
remarkable).
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2. Case Law Development Under the ATCA
In 1980, the Court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala found that State-
sponsored torture constituted a part of the "law of nations"
under the ATCA. 18' Over fifteen years later, a Second Circuit
court in Kadic v. Karadzic found that private individuals can be
liable under the ATCA where the allegations include war crimes
and genocide. 112  Subsequently, plaintiffs began filing suits
against MNCs under the ATCA alleging various human rights
abuses related to MNC activity.18 These suits have often
targeted MNCs involved in extractive industries, such as oil and
mining, 184 but recently, plaintiffs have also attempted to hold
banking institutions liable for knowingly profiting off of human
rights abuses. 185
a. Filartiga
Filartiga involved a wrongful death suit against a Paraguayan
police officer, Americo Norboerto Pena-Irala 86 The plaintiffs
alleged that Pena-Irala kidnapped, tortured, and killed Joelito
Filartiga on May 29, 1976.187 The District Court dismissed the
181. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880, 889 (finding that State-sponsored torture is in-
cluded in "law of nations").
182. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1005 (1996) (holding that genocide and war crimes are violations of international law
whether actor is State official or private individual).
183. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)
(applying ATCA in case against MNC operating in Nigeria for human rights abuses
related to its activities); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 374 (E.D.
La. 1997) (invoking ATCA to bring suit against MNC operating in Indonesia); Doe v.
Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (using ATCA to hold MNC accounta-
ble for human rights violations related to oil pipeline project in Myanmar); Bodner v.
Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (examining facts in ATCA suit by
Holocaust victim's heir against French banks to recover property looted by Nazis and
held by banks).
184. See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92 (stating that defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum
and Shell Transport, are oil and gas companies); Beanal, 969 F. Supp at 163 (noting
that Freeport-McMoRan is mining company); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85 (claiming
that defendants, Unocal and Total, negotiated with government in Myanmar with re-
spect to oil and gas exploration there).
185. See, e.g., Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (claiming that defendants are banking
institutions).
186. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (contending that Filartiga's death resulted from
his father's political activities against government). Dolly Filartiga, the victim's sister,
who was living in the United States, learned of Pena-Irala's presence in the United
States in 1978 and served him with a summons alleging wrongful death. Id. at 879.
187. See id. at 878 (detailing factual allegations against defendant). Mr. Filartiga
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case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,'88 but the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed and allowed recovery under the
ATCA.189 The Court looked to international treaties and ac-
cords, as well as national laws, to determine whether torture
formed a part of customary international law. 19° The Court
attempted to press criminal charges against Pena-Irala in the Paraguayan courts but the
police harassed and threatened his lawyer. Id.
188. See id. at 880 (stating that District Court recognized strength of plaintiffs'
claims but refused to find liability because judge felt obligated to construe "law of na-
tions" narrowly to exclude torture as violation). See generally Michelle M. Meloni, The
Alien Tort Claims Act: A Mechanism for Aliens to Hold Their Foreign Nations Liable for Tortious
Conduct, 5 DETROIT C.L.J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 349, 354-57 (1996) (explaining debate about
subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA).
189. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 889 (reversing District Court dismissal and hold-
ing that federal jurisdiction could be exercised over Filartiga's claim); see also Lillich,
supra note 180, at 399-400 (examining Court of Appeals reasoning in Filartiga). The
court found that State-sponsored torture of persons in detention is a violation of the
"international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
880. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Judge Bork, in a concurring opinion, claimed
that the ACTA does not grant a cause of action to plaintiffs and criticized the Filartiga
decision as interpreting the ATCA too broadly. See 726 F.2d 774, 811-12 (D.C. Cir.
1984) U. Bork concurring) (reasoning that if ATCA grants cause of action to plaintiffs
for violations of international law, it also must grant cause of action for violations of
U.S. treaties and this contradicts rule that treaties may not be sued upon unless direct
federal authorization for cause of action under treaty exists); see also Monroe Leigh,
Jurisdiction-Private Right of Action Under the Law of Nations-Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Under Alien Tort Claims Act-Separation of Powers, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 668, 669-71 (1984)
(explaining varied approaches of three judges in Tel-Oren). In Filartiga's aftermath,
many foreign plaintiffs filed suits against State actors for torture. See, e.g., Abebe-Jiri v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-47 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 830 (1996) (finding
against defendant for torturing three Ethiopian women); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp.
207, 213 (S.D. Fla. 1993), afftd, 901 F. Supp. 330 (1994) (denying motion to dismiss in
suit brought by Haitian torture victims against former head of military). See generally
Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Approach, 3 BUFF. J.
INT'L L. 261, 273 (1996) (criticizing courts for holding foreign state actors liable while
allowing U.S. state actors to remain immune).
190. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882-84; see Marshall, supra note 175, at 601-2 (claiming
that Filartiga Court disregarded historical intent of ATCA and focused narrowly on
whether allegation represented violations of international law). In United States v. La
Jeune Eugenie, Justice Story looked to the practices and customs of states to find that
slave trading violated the law of nations. 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.
15,551). Three years later, Justice Marshall disagreed with Justice Story's conclusion
about the slave trade, finding that the customs and practices prohibiting the slave trade
were not universal and, therefore, were not a part of the law of nations. The Antelope, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120-21 (1825). In the Paquete Habana, the Court held that the
practice of seizing fishing vessels as war prizes was a violation of customary international
law, recognizing that once acceptable norms can ripen into violations of international
law. 175 U.S. 677, 694, 708 (1900); see also Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175,
150-51 (examining facts and analysis of Paquete Habana). The Court further articulated
that judges should consider generally accepted customs where no treaty or controlling
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found that State-sponsored torture violates international custom-
ary law,191 and therefore, if the allegations were proved, Pena-
Irala could be liable under the ATCA. 19 2 The Court limited its
holding to the issue of State-sponsored torture, recognizing that
few other issues are as universally prohibited by the nations of
the world. 19 3
law exists. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The Filartiga Court alluded to this case for
the principle of "ripening." See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (stating that once lawful activi-
ties can ripen into violations of international law, and therefore, law should be inter-
preted at present time of application, not when created); see also Kieserman, supra note
177, at 895-96 (explaining concept of ripening).
191. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Shabtai
Rosenne ed., 2d ed. 1979) (stating that customary international law stands as "evidence
of a general practice accepted as law"). Violations of customary international law must
be universal, defined, and obligatory. Forti v. Saurez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541
(N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Why Unocal Should Be
Liable Under U.S. Law for Human Rights Abuses in Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
35, 54 (1998) (asserting that few crimes rise to level of customary international law
violation because these requirements are strict).
192. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880, 889 (finding that international law prohibits
State-sponsored torture and remanding case to District Court for determination on
merits).
193. See id. at 881 (stating that few crimes are so universally condemned as tor-
ture). On remand, the District Court granted a default judgment to the plaintiffs. Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Judge Kaufman, who de-
cided Filartiga for the Court of Appeals, recognized that ATCA claims must be limited
to only the most universal offenses, and therefore, kept the Filartiga holding very nar-
row, only prohibiting torture. See Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International
Torture?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 1980, at 44, 52. The Filartiga Court's reading of the
ATCA does not focus on allegations of municipal torts but on whether the alleged con-
duct violates the "law of nations." See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (asserting that threshold
question is whether alleged conduct violates "law of nations"). But see Kenneth C. Ran-
dall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute,
18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 33 (1985) (claiming that another approach to applying
ATCA requires that plaintiff establish both municipal tort and violation of international
law, deconstructing ATCA into two parts). In Adra v. Clift, the court allowed separate
allegations of a municipal tort and international law violation to grant jurisdiction over
the claim in its reliance on the ATCA. 795 F. Supp. 857, 862-65 (D. Md. 1961). There,
a Lebanese man sued his ex-wife and her husband for custody of his child, claiming that
the wife took the child unlawfully from his custody and falsified the child's passport in
order to conceal her identity and whereabouts. Id. at 860-61. The Court held that the
unlawful taking of a child from the custody of a parent constitutes a municipal tort. Id.
at 862. The Court then held that tampering with a passport constituted a violation of
international law. Id. at 865. Thus, the Court had jurisdiction under the ATCA. Id. at
862-65; see also Kunstle, supra note 177, at 325-26 (explaining facts of Adra); Rosencranz
& Campbell, supra note 175, at 163 (examining Adra as instance where private individ-
ual faced liability under international law). Judge Edwards claimed this approach as an
alternative to Filartiga in his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
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b. Kadic
In 1995, the Second Circuit expanded the ATCA with the
ruling in Kadic v. Karadzic.'94 In Kadic, the Court found that acts
committed by non-state actors also fell within the realm of the
ATCA. 9 5 The plaintiffs in Kadic, Croat and Muslim citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, brought suit against the leader of the rebel
military forces that engaged in systematic violations of interna-
tional human rights law.' 96
The District Court held that the ATCA does not extend lia-
bility to private individuals and found that Karadzic was a private
actor.' 97 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that certain viola-
tions of the "law of nations" do not require State action and,
thus, private individuals may be held liable under the ATCA for
these crimes.' 98 The Court found that violations involving geno-
787 (. Edwards, concurring) (asserting that under this approach, violation of "law of
nations" represents only one part of multidimensional jurisdictional test).
194. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
195. See id. at 239 (holding that certain conduct violates international law regard-
less of whether committed by State or private individual). The liability of non-State
actors under international law deviates from the traditional notion of international law,
which is only binding on sovereign States. See, e.g., MARK W.JAN1S, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw 238 (3d ed. 1999) (quotingJeremy Bentham's An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, which states that transactions between individuals are
governed by internal laws while international law solely addresses transactions between
sovereigns).
196. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237 (asserting claims against defendant for genocide,
rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, and torture). The defendant headed the
Bosnian-Serb military and also served as the President of "Srpska," a self-proclaimed
state within Bosnia-Herzegovina with no recognition from the international commu-
nity. Id.; see also Alan Frederick Enslen, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit Signifi-
cantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its Decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 48
ALA. L. REv. 695, 698-701 (1997) (explaining facts of Kadic); Marshall, supra note 175,
at 592-94 (analyzing background of Kadic); Kunstle, supra note 177, at 329-30 (examin-
ing allegations in Kadic).
197. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Enslen,
supra note 196, at 701-02 (examining District Court's reasoning in dismissing case
under ATCA); Marshall, supra note 175, at 593-95 (explaining that Judge Leisure based
decision in Kadic on prior ATCA cases that required State action). Although appel-
lants, in their complaint, asserted that Karadzic was a state actor in his capacity as Presi-
dent of Srpska, in a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
they claimed that the defendant was not a government official. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
The District Court concluded that Karadzic was not a state actor because Srpska is not a
state. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 739.
198. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (claiming that early determination of liability of pri-
vate persons for engaging in piracy under international law supports conclusion that
private actors can be liable under international law); see also Kunstle, supra note 177, at
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cide or war crimes do not require State action and, since these
violations were among the allegations, the defendant faced lia-
bility as a private actor under the ATCA.199
The Kadic court's extension of liability for certain crimes to
non-State actors has significance.0 ° Commentators argue that
this expansion of the ATCA has left the application of the ATCA
open to further enlargements. 20 1 Indeed, after Kadic, courts
went on to recognize the possibility of extending ATCA liability
to MNCs. 2
c. Beanal
In 1996, Tom Beanal, an Indonesian citizen and leader of
an indigenous group there, brought suit under the ATCA
against Freeport-McMoRan, a U.S. mining MNC operating in
Beanal's town.2 3 Beanal alleged human rights violations as well
331-37 (explaining Second Circuit's conclusion that non-State actors can be held liable
for certain universal human rights violations).
199. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43 (recognizing that all participants in conflict are
bound by laws of war and, thus, private individuals may be liable for war crimes under
"law of nations"); see also Enslen, supra note 196, at 709-11 (analyzing Second Circuit's
holding that genocide and war crimes do not require State action in order to violate
international law); Marshall, supra note 175, at 608-12 (examining Kadic Court's reason-
ing in holding that certain crimes violate international law without State action). The
court further held that claims of torture and summary execution, when not related to
acts of genocide or war crimes, do require State action. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. The
court opined that Karadzic might be a State actor because of his position as president of
the self-proclaimed republic of Sprska. Id. at 245. Although the international commu-
nity did not recognize Sprska as a State, the court asserted that a State might exist for
the purposes of international human rights law without recognition from other nations.
Id. According to Restatement Third, a State exists when it has (1) power over a defined
territory with a permanent population, (2) government control, and (3) the ability to
engage in formal relations with other States. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 201 (1983).
200. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that genocide and war
crimes are violations of international law whether actor is State official or private indi-
vidual); see also Enslen, supra note 196, at 704-09 (examining Court of Appeals explana-
tion for holding non-State actors liable under ATCA).
201. See, e.g., Enslen, supra note 196, at 728 (claiming that Kadic will open up U.S.
courts to future human rights plaintiffs); Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLULM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531, 546 (criticizing Kadic
court for its broad reading of ATCA).
202. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 374 (E.D. La.
1997) (examining plaintiff's argument to extend ATCA liability to MNC operating in
Indonesia); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (applying ATCA
liability to large oil MNC with respect to project in Myanmar where numerous human
rights abuses occurred as result of project).
203. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 366 (stating that Beanal, chief of Amungme Tribal
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as environmental abuses committed by Freeport-McMoRan.2 °4
Although the Court recognized the potential for MNCs to be
liable under the ATCA,2 °5 it dismissed the case for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 206
Beanal alleged cultural genocide as a basis for finding a vio-
lation of international law.2°7 Although private actors are liable
for genocide without a showing of state action,20 8 the Court
found that Beanal's allegation did not amount to genocide.
20 9
Therefore, the Court would not find Freeport-McMoRan liable
for acts committed in furtherance of genocide under the facts
pled by Beanal.21°
Beanal also alleged other human rights abuses, including
torture, arbitrary detention, and destruction of property.
211
Counsel of Lambaga Adat Suku Amungme, filed suit on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated); see also Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 98 (explaining history and facts of
Beanal).
204. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 365 (detailing Beanal's complaint); see also Hari M.
Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous
Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 338-39 (1997)
(reporting allegations of Beanal); Anastasia Khokhryakova, Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc.: Liability of a Private Actor for an International Environmental Tort Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 463, 472-9 (1998) (examining
three amended complaints in Beanal).
205. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 370 (recognizing that ATCA provides private rights
of action and that private individuals can be liable for violations of "law of nations"
under ATCA).
206. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) (stating that claim may be dismissed for "failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted"); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 384 (dismissing
Beanal's claims without prejudice); see also Khokhryakova, supra note 204, at 476 (ex-
plaining that Beanal Court dismissed plaintiff's claims because plaintiff did not allege
sufficient facts to have standing in court).
207. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 372 (maintaining that Beanal's claim of cultural
genocide was unclear); see also Osofsky, supra note 204, at 354 (asserting that Beanal
Court accepted plaintiff's allegation of cultural genocide as potential claim under
ATCA but dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to connect claim and facts adequately);
Khokhryakova, supra note 204, at 474-75 (examining Beanal's claim of cultural geno-
cide); Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 98-99 (explaining that Beanal's allegation of cultural
genocide results from combination of human rights and environmental abuses).
208. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 372; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-3 (2d Cir.
1995).
209. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373 (stating that genocide is intentional destruc-
tion of group of people rather than culture); see also Khokhryakova, supra note 204, at
475 (asserting that Beanal's genocide claim was essential to success of case).
210. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373 (finding Beanal's allegation of genocide to be
insufficiently clear).
211. See id. at 369 (claiming that alleged acts of torture and arbitrary detention
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Freeport-McMoRan's liability for these violations requires State
action since these acts were not committed in furtherance of ge-
nocide.2 12 After examining relevant tests for determining
whether a private actor engaged in State action,213 the Court
found that Freeport-McMoRan did not have sufficient connec-
tions with the State to establish liability for these allegations. 14
d. Unocal
In 1997, a district court in the Ninth Circuit heard another
ATCA case against an MNC.215 In Doe v. Unocal, farmers from
Myanmar sued Unocal and Total S.A., two large oil companies
occurred on premises of Freeport-McMoRan property); see also Khokhryakova, supra
note 204, at 475 (claiming that Beanal alleged human rights violations separate from
his genocide claim).
212. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373 (noting requirement of State action for non-
genocide related claims); see also Khokhryakova, supra note 204, at 475-76 (reporting
that Beanal court did not accept plaintiffs non-genocide related human rights claims
because these claims require State action); Elizabeth Pinckard, Indonesian Tribe Loses in
Its Latest Battle Against Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., Operator of the World's Largest Gold and Cop-
per Mine, 1997 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 141, 143 (claiming that Beanal Court
rejected plaintiffs human rights claims because he failed to allege State action).
213. See Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir.
1995) (summarizing tests articulated by Supreme court). There are four ways of deter-
mining if state action exists: public function, symbiotic relationship, nexus, and joint
action. See id. (examining four state action tests); see also Rosencranz & Campbell, supra
note 175, at 160 (explaining state action tests as restated in Gallagher).
214. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (claiming that Beanal failed to allege requisite
facts to convert Freeport's actions into State action). The Court also dismissed Beanal's
environmental claims, holding that these allegations did not constitute violations of
international law. Id. at 383-84. Beanal amended his complaint in an attempt to allege
the necessary facts, but the same court also dismissed the amended complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.
1999); see also Khokhryakova, supra note 204, at 476-77 (explaining dismissal of Beanal's
subsequent amended complaints). The Beanal Court's formal application of the State
action doctrine established a high factual threshold for ATCA plaintiffs at the pleading
stage. See Kieserman, supra note 177, at 926 (explaining that despite allegations of
significant investment in project, existing contractual arrangement between govern-
ment and Freeport-McMoRan, and military presence at Freeport-McMoRan site in In-
donesia, Beanal Court refused to find State action). This result places a substantial
burden on plaintiffs alleging human rights abuses under the ATCA. See Zia-Zarifi, supra
note 25, at 121-22 (maintaining that ATCA plaintiffs have high factual burden to pro-
ceed beyond pleading stage). Since most ATCA plaintiffs are unlikely to have the requi-
site information to submit a detailed pleading, courts following the Beanal Court's ex-
ample are likely to dismiss ATCA suits at the pleading stage. See id. at 123 (asserting
that U.S. courts will ultimately demand high factual threshold for ATCA plaintiffs at
pleading stage).
215. Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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operating in Myanmar.216 The plaintiffs alleged a variety of
human rights abuses, including forced labor, torture, and rape,
committed by the repressive regime in Myanmar.217 The claim
revolves around Unocal's funding of, knowledge of, and benefit
from human rights abuses committed by the State Law and Or-
der Restoration Council 218 ("SLORC") in furtherance of a joint
pipeline project between Unocal and SLORC.2 19
The Court held that private corporations could be held lia-
ble under the ATCA for joint action in complicity with the
State. 22' The Unocal Court asserted that joint action is found
216. See id. at 883 (commenting that plaintiffs are from region in Myanmar where
Unocal operates pipeline project); see also Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 97 (examining
facts of Unocal); RobertJ. Peterson, Comment, Political Realism and the Judicial Imposition
of International Secondary Sanctions: Possibilities from John Doe v. Unocal and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 277, 279-80 (1998) (explaining background
to Unocal case); Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation and Private
Enterprise Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM.
REG. 1, 1-11, 27-42 (1998) (examining facts and history behind allegations as well as
procedural history in Unocal); Wells, supra note 191, at 38-39 (1998) (describing cir-
cumstances giving rise to Unocal suit); Eileen Rice, Note, Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Cor-
porate Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 33 U.S.F. L. Rav. 153, 159 (1998)
(detailing facts alleged by plaintiffs in Unocal). The action was filed against Unocal,
Total S.A., the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise ("MOGE"), the State Law and Order
Restoration Council ("SLORC"), as well as some individual officers of Unocal. Doe v.
Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883. However, the Court held that SLORC and MOGE were
immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). Id. at 888; see also Rice,
supra, at 160 (noting that Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that State Law and Order
Restoration Council's ("SLORC's") activities fell within commercial exception to FSIA).
Total, S.A. was later dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe v.
Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
217. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85 (detailing factual allegations of Unocal); see
also Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 97 (explaining that Unocal plaintiffs asserted human
rights claims including rape, torture, and murder); Dhooge, supra note 216, at 19-27
(describing Myanmar government's history of human rights abuses).
218. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85 (explaining history behind SLORC's rise to
power in Myanmar). SLORC took power in Burma in a military coup on September 18,
1988, and renamed the country "Myanmar." Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884. After the
opposition democratic party gained the majority of parliamentary seats in elections in
May 1990, SLORC arrested the leaders of the opposition and maintained repressive
control of Myanmar. Id.; see also Dhooge, supra note 216, at 11-19 (describing political
history and economic conditions of Myanmar).
219. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 884-85 (explaining facts concerning Unocal's pipe-
line project with SLORC and plaintiff's human rights allegations); see also Zia Zarifi,
supra note 25, at 97 (describing claims against Unocal as result of joint venture with
SLORC); Wells, supra note 191, at 41 (stating that allegations against Unocal included
knowledge of, and benefit from, human rights abuses committed by SLORC); Peterson,
supra note 216, at 280 (examining joint venture between SLORC, Unocal, and Total,
S.A., called Yadana pipeline project, and explaining complicity allegations).
220. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (holding that where claim alleges joint action
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where there is a considerable amount of cooperation between
the government and private entities in depriving people of their
rights.2 2 1 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs alleged forced la-
bor, the Court found that Unocal might be liable without State
action since forced labor can be considered within the ambit of
slave trading.222 The Court denied Unocal's motion to dis-
MiS223miss. 22
At trial in Doe v. Unocal2 24 ("Unocal II"), the Court held that
Unocal was not liable for the violations because Unocal did not
have the necessary degree of connection to the State to establish
joint action. 225 The Court acknowledged that Unocal knew of
the practice of using forced labor, but it did not take active steps
to further such a practice, and, therefore, the Court dismissed
the case against Unocal . 2 6 Although, the initial District Court
opinion in Unocal provides a framework for holding corpora-
between State and MNC violating international law, there is subject matter jurisdiction
under ATCA); Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 164 (explaining that Unocal
Court held that private MNCs are potentially liable for human rights abuses even absent
State action); Wells, supra note 191, at 51 (examining Unocal Court's analysis of Unocal
as State actor); Rice, supra note 216, at 162 (asserting that Unocal Court's recognition
that MNCs can be liable for international law violations will have broad impact on U.S.
businesses operating abroad).
221. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891 (claiming that joint action requires substantial
degree of cooperation); see also Dhooge, supra note 216, at 34 (describing Unocal
Court's analysis of when joint action exists between State and private actors).
222. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892 (recognizing that private actors could be held
liable for human rights abuses without State action where allegations include slave trad-
ing or piracy); see also Wells, supra note 191, at 47-52 (examining Unocal Court's jurisdic-
tion with respect to allegations of forced labor and Unocal's liability without showing of
State action); Dhooge, supra note 216, at 35 (explaining that Unocal could be liable
without evidence of State action because plaintiffs alleged forced labor, which is related
to slave trading). Combined with Kadic, the list of claims available against non-State
actors for violating international law include, genocide, war crimes, slave trading, and
piracy. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 892; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir.
1995).
223. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 898 (denying Unocal's motion to dismiss, finding
that Court had subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA, and holding that SLORC and
MOGE were not indispensable parties); see also Wells, supra note 191, at 4041 (explain-
ing Unocal Court's reasoning in denying motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to join indispensable party); Dhooge, supra note 216, at 29, 31, 33 (describing
Unocal Court's analysis finding jurisdiction over Unocal and refusing to deem SLORC
and MOGE as indispensable parties); Rice, supra note 216, at 160-62 (explaining
Court's logic in refusing to dismiss case against Unocal).
224. Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
225. See id. at 1306-1307 (holding for Unocal on summary judgment motion,
claiming that Unocal did not engage in joint State action).
226. Id. at 1310; see also Peterson, supra note 216, at 282 (explaining complications
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tions accountable for their complicity with repressive regimes,227
the final decision of the Unocal Court reveals that establishing a
case against an MNC under this framework will be extremely dif-
ficult.22
8
e. Swiss Bank Litigation
In late 1996 and early 1997, Holocaust survivors and their
descendants filed three suits against Swiss banks alleging that the
banks knowingly profited from slave labor and stolen property
during the Nazi reign in Germany. 229 They alleged participation
and complicity with the Nazi regime in perpetrating crimes
against humanity, crimes against the peace, and war crimes, and
claimed liability under the ATCA. 2' ° The Eizenstat Report,23 1 of-
of Unocal since all previous ATCA cases held perpetrators directly liable for committing
human rights abuses, not simply for knowledge of or benefit from such violations).
227. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891-92 (finding that allegations ofjoint action be-
tween MNC and State, as well as claims of forced labor, are sufficient for subject matter
jurisdiction under ATCA).
228. See Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (granting summary judgment to Uno-
cal).
229. See generally Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 332 (examining Swiss banking se-
crecy laws and their negative effect on redress efforts by victims of human rights
abuses); Derek Brown, Litigating the Holocaust: A Consistent Theory in Tort for the Private
Enforcement of Human Rights Violations, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 553, 566-69 (2000) (describing
cases against Swiss banks and subsequent settlement agreement). The cases filed were
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-CV-4849 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1996); Freidman
v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96-CV-5161 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996); and World Council
of Orthodox Jewish Communities, No. 97-CV-0461 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1997) (Am. Compl.
July 1997) [hereinafter WCOJC Complaints]. After being amended, the claims were
separated into four groups: the Weisshaus, Sonabend, Trilling-Gotch, and WCOJC Com-
plaints. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 377. The complaints also alleged that the
Swiss banks were preventing Holocaust victims and their heirs from access to dormant
accounts with the banks. Id. at 374-76. The Sonabend Complaint encompasses those
plaintiffs who are aliens, making claims under international customary law. Id. at 377.
Holocaust survivors and their heirs have also filed suits against German, French, and
Austrian banks, alleging that these banks benefited from looted property and gold be-
longing to the plaintiffs. See generally MichaelJ. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating
the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RiCH. L. REv. 1, 237-48 (examining suits
against non-Swiss banks for crimes committed during Holocaust).
230. See Freidman Complaint, No. 96-CV-5161 at 24 (claiming that Holocaust plain-
tiffs' international law claims revolve around allegation that Swiss banks acquired prop-
erty as result of illegal activities of Nazis); Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 377, 387 (exam-
ining Holocaust plaintiffs' international law claims). Besides the international law
claims, other theories of liability are the tort principles of conversion and unjust enrich-
ment. Freidman Complaint, No. 96-CV-5161 at 92-4. These claims are not recoverable
under the ATCA because they are not violations of the customary international law. See
ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting argument that steal-
ing was in violation of "law of nations" for purposes of ATCA); see also Unocal II, 110 F.
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ficially ordered by the U.S. government, speculates that Swiss
banks prolonged the war by providing funds to the Nazis. 32
The Holocaust plaintiffs invoked the Nuremberg Princi-
ples233 to prove liability on the part of the banks. 234 The Nurem-
berg Principles are a restatement of the legal principles devel-
oped by the International Law Commission and recognized in
the Nuremberg Charter, the decisions of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal235 ("IMT") that convicted Nazi war criminals ("Nu-
remberg Tribunals"), and customary international law.236 Princi-
ple VI of the Nuremberg Principles defines crimes against the
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.23 7 Principle VII
provides that complicity in committing a crime against the
Supp. 2d at 1304 (asserting that violations of "law of nations" include genocide, war
crimes, slavery, and torture). While the banks' actions may have been immoral, or fo-
cused solely on profit, it is arguable whether these actions amount to violations of inter-
national law. See WalterJ. Rockler, Bankers Not Collaborators, WASH. POST, July 22, 1997,
at A15 (arguing that litigation against Swiss banks for involvement in Holocaust is
warped).
231. WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER
AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD
WAR II, PRELIMINARY STUDY (coordinated by Stuart E. Eizenstat) (May 1997), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9705_ng_links.html [hereinafter EIZEN-
STAT REPORT]; see also Brown, supra note 229, at 579-80 (explaining mandate of Eizen-
stat report and subsequent investigation).
232. See EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 231, at xxvi (noting importance of relations
with Switzerland in sustaining Germany's war effort).
233. Nuremberg Principles, supra note 18; see also Frank Lawrence, The Nuremberg
Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 399-401 (1989) (examin-
ing historical events leading up to adoption of Nuremberg Principles by United Na-
tions).
234. Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 397.
235. See id. at 394-95 (claiming that International Military Tribunal ("IMT") was
established to try Nazi war criminals after World War II and examining origins of IMT);
Lawrence, supra note 233, at 399-400 (noting that IMT was result of agreement between
United States, Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, called London Agreement, and
that IMT was established to prosecute war criminals).
236. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 396-97 (stating that International Law Com-
mission developed Nuremberg Principles and that Nuremberg Principles are recog-
nized in Nuremberg Charter, Nazi war criminal court judgments, and customary inter-
national law); Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.
CAL. L. REv. 833, 871-75 (1990) (claiming that Nuremberg Principles are incorporated
into U.N. Charter and discussing qualification of Nuremberg Principles as part of cus-
tomary international law); Lawrence, supra note 233, at 406-11 (analyzing argument
that Nuremberg Principles are part of customary international law).
237. Nuremberg Principles, supra note 18. Principle VI asserts that:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international
law:
I. a. Crimes against the peace:
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peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity violates interna-
tional law. 2 8 These Principles are accepted as precedent in in-
ternational law.239
At the Nuremberg Tribunals, Frederick Flick, a German in-
dustrialist, was convicted of spoliation and plunder for his take-
over of a cement plant in France. 240 Although the IMT was hesi-
tant to equate property crimes to crimes against humanity, the
IMT found Flick guilty for accepting and retaining property that
he knew the Nazi regime had obtained unlawfully.24 1 Thus,
A.(1) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances
B.(2) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the acts mentioned in (1)
II. b. War crimes
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation of slave-labor, or for any other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of pris-
oners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity.
III. c. Crimes against humanity
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts
done against any civilian population or persecutions on political, racial or re-
ligious grounds, when such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in
connection [sic] with any crime of peace or any war crime.
Id.
238. See id. (stating that "[c]omplicity in the commission on a crime against the
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime
under international law").
239. See Fogelson, supra note 235, at 875 (commenting that Nuremberg Principles
have become part of international law precedent); see also Lawrence, supra note 233, at
411 (arguing that Nuremberg Principles are part of customary international law, which
is binding law for U.S. courts).
240. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 420 (examining Flick case and noting Flick's
involvement in management of French cement plant in Lorraine during World War II);
Matthew Lippman, Conundrums Of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses To Violations Of The
Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 61-62 (1996) [hereinafter Lippman,
Conundrums] (explaining background of Flick case); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes
Tribunals of German Industrialists: The "Other" Schindlers, 9 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 173,
193 (1995) [hereinafter Lippman, War Crimes Tribunals] (describing how Flick gained
control over steel mills and smelting plants in France).
241. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 422, 425 (noting that IMT did not generally
equate property crimes with crimes against humanity but found Flick guilty for his
seizure and continued operation of civilian property in occupied territory during war-
time); see also Lippman, War Crimes Tribunals, supra note 240, at 202 (asserting that Flick
had potential defense of necessity but that IMT found that his intent was to plunder).
The International Military Tribunal ("IMT") also convicted Flick of contributing money
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knowingly supporting and accepting looted property from war
criminals is a violation of international law under the Nurem-
berg precedent.
24 2
The Nuremberg trials in general, and the Flick conviction
in particular, strengthen the Holocaust plaintiffs' claims.243 The
Unocal II summary judgment decision, however, required a high
degree of cooperation between a State and private actor to find
individual liability under the ATCA, presenting a potential prob-
lem for the Holocaust plaintiff's claims.2 44 The parties to the
Holocaust litigation eventually settled, and therefore, no judicial
opinion was ever made regarding the legitimacy of the claims
under international law.245
3. Criticisms of ATCA
Courts' willingness to entertain claims 2 46 against MNCs
under the ATCA reveals a changing sentiment towards such
suits. 2 4 7 Commentators generally agree, however, that the ATCA
to the Nazi police force, known as the SS, with full knowledge their criminal activities.
Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 421; see also Lippman, War Crimes Tribunals, supra note
240, at 198-99 (explaining Flick's involvement with SS).
242. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 420-21 (noting that although Flick's actions
did not constitute systemic plunder conceived of by Hitler, he was liable for seizure of
private property). But see Unocal I, 110 F. Supp 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
that Flick case was predicated on active participation in illegal activities rather than sim-
ple knowledge of crimes).
243. See Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 425-26 (asserting that Holocaust victims will
use Flick conviction to support theory that illegal seizure of property is basis for prose-
cution).
244. See Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07 (noting that plaintiffs presented no
evidence that Unocal influenced, controlled, or participated in unlawful activities of
SLORC, while acknowledging that Unocal knew or should have known about these un-
lawful activities).
245. See Daniel Wise, $1.25 Billion Deal Set on Holocaust Claims; Settlement Approval
Critical of Swiss Response, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2000, at 1 (reporting that Holocaust victims
settled with Swiss banks for US$1,250,000,000); see also Brown, supra note 229, at 567-68
(describing settlement agreement between Holocaust plaintiffs and Swiss banks).
246. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(reversing lower Court's dismissal of ATCA case against MNC on grounds of forum non
conveniens); Jason Hoppin, Chevron Hit with Human Rights Claim, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 24,
2000, at BI (allowing case against oil MNC to proceed for alleged human rights viola-
tions in Nigeria); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy,
FOREIGN Aes., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102, 110 (asserting that courts' readiness to hear
ATCA cases against MNCs may lead to large settlement agreements).
247. See generally Dhooge, supra note 216, at 67 (asserting that Unocal decision re-
flects new readiness of judiciary to address issues traditionally reserved for foreign af-
fairs); Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transna-
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is a weak method of holding corporations accountable for their
activities in nations outside their home country.24 8 ATCA plain-
tiffs face several obstacles in bringing suit against an MNC, in-
cluding meeting the high factual threshold,249 overcoming a fo-
rum non conveniens motion,25 ° obtaining personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, 251 and showing State action for most human
rights allegations.252
a. High Factual Threshold
The first potential problem with utilizing the ATCA to hold
tional Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 359, 362
(1999) (maintaining that courts have demonstrated willingness to hear international
human rights claims); Peterson, supra note 216, at 298 (speculating that using ATCA to
hold MNCs liable is effective method for imposing secondary sanctions on "rogue"
states); Wells, supra note 191, at 71 (claiming that MNCs should not be immune from
liability for human rights abuses and that Unocal decision was proper). One scholar
claims that the continuing expansion of the ATCA violates separation of powers. Don-
aldJ. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the "Law of Nations" in
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153, 171 (1998).
248. See generally Tzeutschler, supra note 247, 369-70 (1999) (noting that Act of
State doctrine allows corporations to continue activities with relative impunity);
Kieserman, supra note 177, at 925 (claiming that ATCA allows corporate defendants to
commit human rights abuses through any means except using official foreign troops,
which would constitute State action); Laura Bowersett, Doe v. Unocal: Tortuous Decision
for Multinationals Doing Business in Politically Unstable Environments, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAw.
361, 375-79 (1998) (alleging that Unocal facts do not justify finding liability under
ATCA). Commentators have proposed new legislation to address the ATCA's weak-
nesses, particularly with regard to holding MNCs liable. See GregoryJ. Wallace, Linked
to Slavery, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at 24 (commenting that Unocal case is problem-
atic because it does not offer guidance to MNCs operating outside home countries and
suggests that Congress should enact "Foreign Human Rights Abuse Act" to provide
standards for MNCs with respect to human rights); John Christopher Anderson, Respect-
ing Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463,
500-01 (2000) (suggesting that Congress adopt legislation called "Foreign Human
Rights Abuse Act" that would provide cause of action for victims of human rights abuses
against MNCs that assisted in, participated in, or knowingly benefited from such
abuses).
249. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 121 (commenting that high factual threshold
is obstacle for ATCA plaintiffs).
250. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Con-
veniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 46 (1998) (noting that
forum non conveniens is difficult barrier for ATCA recovery).
251. See McDonald, supra note 173, at 191-93 (reviewing personal jurisdiction re-
quirements and application in ATCA suits).
252. See, e.g., Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing
case against MNC because plaintiffs failed to prove State action); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 373-74 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing case because plaintiff
did not show requisite level of State action).
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MNCs accountable is that the plaintiff must meet a high thresh-
old of factual evidence. 2 3  Often, a judge will grant a defen-
dant's failure to state a claim motion in ATCA cases.2 54 The
plaintiff will struggle to satisfy this requirement because evi-
dence of an MNC's participation in violations of international
law is often difficult to obtain.255 Although in some instances
courts have allowed limited discovery for the plaintiff to establish
the requisite facts, 25 6 generally courts demand a highly devel-
oped factual basis for the continuation of a case under the
ATCA. 257
b. Forum Non Conveniens
Defendants also will likely object to an ATCA suit based on
forum non conveniens. 25' Forum non conveniens is granted
when a case can be pursued more effectively and fairly in an-
other country.259 The events giving rise to an ATCA claim often
253. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 121 (explaining that factual requirements
faced by ATCA plaintiffs are stringent).
254. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) (allowing dismissal of case at pleading stage for
failure to state claim); see, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir.
1999) (dismissing Beanal's claim on grounds of failure to state claim); see also Zia-Zarifi,
supra note 25, at 121 (comparing dismissal of plaintiff's claim in Beanal because he did
not include enough facts in his claim with Unocal Court's initial willingness to let case
continue because there were specific factual allegations).
255. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 122 (stating that corporations may be uncoop-
erative and unwilling to provide plaintiffs with necessary information to meet factual
requirements).
256. See, e.g., Bodnerv. Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (assuming
allegations to be true until further discovery proves otherwise); Khokhryakova, supra
note 204, at 472-77 (explaining Beanal's three amended complaints).
257. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 123 (noting that ATCA plaintiffs will encoun-
ter high factual threshold as barrier to recovery).
258. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reversing District Court's decision to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens);
Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens). See generally Boyd, supra note 250, at 58-85 (asserting that fo-
rum non conveniens should be abolished with respect to human rights litigation). Fo-
rum non conveniens is a common law doctrine grounded in concerns about the conve-
nience of the forum for the parties and the court. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (recognizing that forum non conveniens analysis only revolves
around determination of convenience).
259. See In re Union Carbide, 809 F.2d 195, 198-99 (reviewing District Court exam-
ination of whether claim arising out of industrial gas plant accident in India is more
properly pursued in Indian courts); Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 179-80
(explaining court's two part analysis to first determine if there is adequate, alternative
forum, and then consider variety of private and public interests).
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occur in another nation, and because of this, defendants argue
that the United States is not the proper place for a trial.260
For example, in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Nigerian
plaintiffs brought suit against Shell and Royal Dutch Petroleum,
two oil companies, for their direct and indirect involvement in
human rights abuses perpetrated by the Nigerian State. 261  The
defendants moved to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds.262 The Second Circuit held that the defendants failed
to establish that the claims would be more appropriately ad-
dressed in a court outside the United States. 263 The Court also
set out additional factors for a forum non conveniens analysis,
264
such as the principle that there should be increased deference
to the plaintiffs choice of forum when the plaintiff has substan-
tial ties to that forum. 265 The Court found that since the plain-
tiffs lived in the United States, changing the forum of the suit
would impose a significant hardship on them.2 66
Additionally, where the United States has an interest in liti-
gating the claim, courts should strive to maintain the suit in U.S.
court.26 7 The plaintiff in Wiwa argued against a forum non con-
veniens dismissal by appealing to the U.S. policy interest in liti-
260. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 141 (noting that forum non conveniens analy-
sis will often depend upon availability of alternative, adequate forum); McDonald, supra
note 173, at 195-96 (1997) (commenting on suit by former forced laborers under Nazi
regime and noting forum non conveniens as potential reason for U.S. courts not to
hear suit).
261. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92 (stating that plaintiffs claim alleges that oil compa-
nies acted with Nigerian police to imprison, torture, and kill Nigerian citizens); see also
Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 183-85 (discussing allegations in Wiwa); Zia-
Zarifi, supra note 25, at 94 (explaining facts of Wiwa).
262. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 94 (stating that lower Court dismissed on grounds of
forum non conveniens); Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 185 (discussing
lower Court dismissal of plaintiffs' claims on forum non conveniens).
263. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 101 (refusing to dismiss on grounds of forum non con-
veniens).
264. See id. at 100 (claiming that District Court did not give sufficient weight to all
relevant factors in forum non conveniens finding); see also Rosencranz & Campbell,
supra note 175, at 179-88 (examining various factors to be considered in deciding
whether case should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds).
265. See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 101-02 (asserting that courts should accord deference to
plaintiff's chosen forum, especially where plaintiff has significant ties to that forum).
266. See id., 226 F.3d at 103 (noting that although plaintiffs were not residents of
district in which they filed, they were U.S. residents and it is appropriate to be deferen-
tial to their choice of forum).
267. See id. at 101 (noting that District Court did not give sufficient weight to U.S.
interest in litigating claim).
1456 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1402
gating human rights claims. 268 The Court recognized that fo-
rum non conveniens represents a major setback for victims of
human rights abuses seeking redress.269 The Court claimed that
the passage of the Torture Victims Protection Act 27 ° ("TVPA") in
1991 is acknowledgement by Congress that victims of gross
human rights violations need an accessible forum. 271  Allowing
defendants to avoid law suits by claiming forum non conveniens
would run contrary to Congress's policy reflected in the
TPVA.272
c. Personal Jurisdiction
Another obstacle to an ATCA suit against an MNC is per-
sonal jurisdiction, particularly when the MNC is not based in the
United States.2 73 Courts apply the minimum contacts test to de-
termine whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendant is in
accordance with principles of "fair play and substantial jus-
tice. ' 274 The minimum contacts test requires that the court as-
268. See id. at 103 (claiming that Torture Victims Protection Act ("TPVA") reflects
U.S. policy towards torture victims litigating in U.S. courts).
269. See id. at 106 (noting that forum non conveniens presents particular difficul-
ties for torture victims because, where state is accused, it is unlikely that that state will
provide adequate forum).
270. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (stating that any individual who "subjects [another] indi-
vidual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual"). The
Torture Victims Protection Act ("TPVA") was enacted in response to the Filartiga litiga-
tion. See id. at 104 (claiming that passage of TPVA reflected approval of Filartiga deci-
sion); see also Kunstle, supra note 177, at 344 (asserting that Congress passed TPVA in
order to grant individuals private right of action against their torturers). See generally
Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital Contribution to International
Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 197, 208-21 (1994)
(examining provisions of TPVA and its implications for international human rights liti-
gation).
271. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106.
272. Id.
273. See McDonald, supra note 173, at 191 (examining difficulties presented by
personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts requirements); see also Doe v. Unocal, 27 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (dismissing Total SA from Unocal suit for lack of
minimum contacts with United States).
274. See Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (stating that defendant must have sufficient minimum
contacts so that maintenance of suit is not contrary to traditional conceptions of fair-
ness and justice); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (noting that to satisfy minimum contacts test, defendant must purposefully avail
himself of privileges associated with acting in relevant forum); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (stating that once minimum contacts have been
established, Court should examine reasonableness of jurisdiction); World Wide Volk-
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sess the degree of contact of the party with the forum state as
well as the relatedness of the contacts to the claim at issue.275
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct., the Supreme Court
held that where a non-U.S. company simply places a product in
the stream of commerce in the United States, minimum contacts
have not been met and jurisdiction is improper.276 The Asahi
Court provided examples of activities that may subject a non-U.S.
defendant to personal jurisdiction, including advertising in the
particular jurisdiction.277 Jurisdiction over a corporation also is
available where the level of activity in the forum state is "continu-
ous and systematic. '278  Notably, in a suit against a defendant
that is not a U.S. entity, the court may find that the corporation
has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States, rather
than any particular state.279
A possible exception to the minimum contacts test arises if
the alleged violation is a "universal offense, 28 ° such as slave trad-
swagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (claiming that potential burden on defen-
dant should be considered in determining personal jurisdiction).
275. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (noting that test for determining personal juris-
diction is not only amount of contacts, but also quality and nature of contacts).
276. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
277. Id.
278. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (noting that presence in state gives rise to "continu-
ous and systematic" contacts). "Continuous and systematic" contacts means that the
defendant corporation took advantage of the privilege of carrying out business in the
forum State, giving the company notice that it could be hailed into court there. See id.
at 319; see also World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (claiming that defendant's con-
duct and connection to forum State should be enough to create anticipation of being
hailed into court in forum State).
279. See Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Rule 4 of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and asserting that jurisdiction could be exercised over defen-
dant if he had requisite level of contacts with United States rather than only forum
state). Since the 1993 amendment of Rule 4, it is unclear whether jurisdiction may be
obtained by assessing the aggregate national contacts of an alien defendant when the
case involves a federal question. Id. A "national contacts" test is provided for in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (2). Rule (4) (k) (2) in part states
that:
[i]f the exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and the laws
of the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also
effective, with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal
jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id. Using Tel-Oren as an example, one commentator argues that the Palestinian
Liberation Organization has sufficient contacts with the United States to reasonably
expect to be hailed into court and to give the United States a legitimate interest in
adjudicating a claim against it. Randall, supra note 193, at 67.
280. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 404 (stating that certain
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ing, hijacking planes, genocide, and war crimes.2 8t Any state has
jurisdiction over these claims, regardless of the nationality of the
parties or the place where the event giving rise to the suit oc-
curred.28 2 In an ATCA claim, it is often possible that the allega-
tions will include universal offenses.
283
d. State Action
Traditionally, international law binds States rather than in-
dividuals or corporations.28 4 To hold a private individual liable
under principles of international law, a showing of State action is
often necessary. 285 Although courts have held that genocide,
war crimes, slavery, and piracy do not require State action,2 8 6 the
vast majority of human rights violations will require State action
for the ATCA to apply.2
87
offenses may be prosecuted in any state because they are so universally prohibited); see
also Marshall, supra note 175, at 606-07 (explaining concept of universal jurisdiction);
Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 158-59 (positing that although universal
jurisdiction is established legal principle, it may not apply in United States because of
federal system).
281. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404. Complicity in war
crimes is not included as a universal offense by the Restatement. See id. (failing to
include complicity in war crimes in list of universal offenses).
282. See Willard B. Cowles, Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv.
178, 177, 180-81 (1945) (stating that States have power to hear any criminal matter so
long as jurisdiction is not prohibited by international law and commenting thatjurisdic-
tion over punishment of war crimes is universal); Marshall, supra note 175, at 606-07
(maintaining that universal jurisdiction attaches to most heinous crimes and any state
may prosecute perpetrators for these crimes).
283. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging acts of
genocide), Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. La. 1997) (alleg-
ing cultural genocide); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (asserting
that claims of forced labor can be considered slave trading).
284, See 1 PPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw § 6 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (commenting that States are primary subjects of international
law).
285. See, e.g., Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing
case for failure to prove State action); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 373-74 (dismissing case
because plaintiff did not show role of State in allegations).
286. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43; Unocal, 963 F. Supp at 892. The crimes that do not
require State action overlap with "universal offenses." RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw § 404. Courts have analogized the State action requirement in interna-
tional law with the State action requirement in domestic anti-discrimination law under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (stating that "color of law" jurispru-
dence of §1983 is instructive for determining if there has been State action in interna-
tional context); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374 (using § 1983 as guide in determining
whether State action exists).
287. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (stating that viola-
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The Unocal II decision applied a joint action test 288 to ascer-
tain whether the corporation had sufficient connections with the
State to be liable.2 9 The joint action test requires that the State
and the MNC work together for the specific purpose of depriv-
ing people of their rights.29 ° The standard established by Unocal
II requires that the private entity actually commit the alleged
acts in cooperation with the State or exercise control over the
211State's action.
This standard presents difficulties in holding MNCs liable
under the ATCA because often MNCs and States develop a rela-
tionship for mutually beneficial business purposes. 292  MNCs
that partner with governments, who commit human rights
abuses, do so for financial reasons. 293 Similarly, governments en-
joy the prominence associated with large MNCs and the money
generated by MNC operations in their country.294 The MNC
need not directly commit human rights abuses nor unduly influ-
ence an already corrupt government to realize its profits because
the government is willing to engage in these practices to main-
tain the business relationship. 9 The MNC's main goal is profit,
tions that require State action include torture, arbitrary detention, disappearances, and
racial discrimination).
288. See Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir.
1995) (explaining that this test examines whether State and private entity have acted in
concert in deprivation of rights of others).
289. See Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-1307 (noting that allegations failed to
establish State action under joint action test or proximate cause test for determining
State action).
290. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1454 (examining joint action test).
291. See Unocal II, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1306-07 (commenting that plaintiffs did not
prove that Unocal participated in violations, or influenced or controlled SLORC's ac-
tions).
292. See Kieserman, supra note 177, at 916 (noting that despite extensive commer-
cial relationship between Freeport-McMoRan and Indonesian government evidenced in
facts of Beanal, contacts still were not close enough to establish State action).
293. See PETER MARBER, FROM THIRD WORLD TO WORLD CLASS: THE FUTURE OF
EMERGING MARKETS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 87-104 (1998) (discussing benefits for
MNCs operating in countries where human rights have not been prioritized); see also
Kieserman, supra note 177, at 910-11 (explaining mutually beneficial relationship be-
tween MNCs and governments of nations with bad human rights records).
294. See Kieserman, supra note 177, at 911 (noting that in countries that do not
respect human rights, revenue from collaborating with MNC often is used to finance
military).
295. See generally id. at 911, 916-17 (criticizing Beanal Court for its unwillingness to
classify Freeport-McMoRan's activities as State action despite close working relationship
between government and MNC).
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not violating human rights. 296
Furthermore, State actors are often shielded from liability
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 2 97 ("FSIA" ).298
One strategy utilized by corporate defendants in ATCA litigation
is to win a dismissal for State actors in the suit under the FSIA
and then plead indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure.299 If a court finds that a party is
essential to the litigation but cannot be joined to the suit, the
court then must analyze whether the case should proceed with
the remaining parties considering the potential prejudice to any
party, the possible relief available without the absent party, and
alternative locations for trial. 00 When a government is dis-
missed under the FSIA and an MNC successfully claims that the
296. See generally Tzeustcher, supra note 246, at 414 (noting that corporations often
lack requisite intent to commit violations of international law such as genocide).
297. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) [hereinafter
FSIA] (stating that "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States and of the States").
298. See id. (allowing foreign sovereign defendants to escape liability). There are
exceptions to this law, most notably, an exception to immunity where the activity is
commercial in nature. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000). The exceptions clause to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") states, in part, that:
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case... in which the action is based upon
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
See generally David J. Bederman, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law
in U.S. Courts: Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human
Rights Litigation, 25 GA.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 255 (1996) (analyzing problems of FSIA in
human rights litigation).
299. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. Rule 19 states, in part, that:
[a] person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not de-
prive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already present [and i]f [such] a person...
cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should
be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.
Id. The defendants in Unocal attempted this strategy but were unsuccessful. Doe v.
Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880, 885-889 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that defendants moved to
dismiss state actors under FSIA and then pleaded indispensable parties to have entire
case dismissed); see also Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 175, at 203 (discussing
interplay between FSIA and Rule 19).
300. See Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 889 (examining considerations for determination
of whether parties are indispensable).
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government actor is an indispensable party, the MNC avoids lia-
bility through the benefit of the State partner's sovereign immu-
nity.30
1
B. Methods of Regulating MNCs
Little uniform binding law exists to regulate MNC activity
when they operate outside their country of incorporation." ° In-
ternational organizations, governments, and private industry ac-
tors have recognized the need for corporate accountability in
MNC activities outside their home country and have responded
to this need with corporate codes of conduct.30 3 Codes of con-
duct are helpful to MNCs operating in countries other than
their home nation because they provide standards and guide-
lines for respecting human rights. °4 Codes of conduct, how-
ever, are often criticized for being unenforceable due to their
voluntary nature. 0 5
301. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(dismissing ATCA suit on grounds of indispensable parties). Where this strategy does
not work, the courts may face a remarkable paradox. Kieserman, supra note 177, at 909-
10. The government actor will be immune under the FSIA. Id. at 909. The MNC will
be charged with violating human rights, which require a showing of State action. Id. at
910. Thus, the MNC can be held liable the joint activities of the State and the MNC
while the State escapes liability entirely. Id. Furthermore, the court must find that the
violation is of such magnitude that all States condemn such action and simultaneously
acknowledge that a government, which condones such activity, is not liable for the vio-
lation. Id.
302. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 84 (asserting that public international law does
not obligate MNCs to observe any minimum human rights standards); Wells, supra note
191, at 65 (claiming no controlling law regulates MNCs at present); Sacharoff, supra
note 179, at 931 (maintaining that MNCs are only required to follow laws of country in
which they operate); Kieserman, supra note 177, at 881-83 (alleging that MNCs have
ability to operate in many countries with no accountability).
303. See OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 972-76 (establishing guidelines for
MNC activity); Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164, at 425-28 (proposing standards for
treatment of workers by MNCs); Draft U.N. Code, supra note 164, at para. 14 (claiming
that MNCs should respect human rights); Model Principles, supra note 164 (urging
MNCs to adopt codes of conduct reflecting respect for fundamental rights); Sullivan
Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (providing standards for MNCs operating in South
Africa during apartheid); Irish National Caucus, supra note 164 (establishing code of
conduct for MNCs operating in Northern Ireland).
304. See, e.g., Model Principles, supra note 164 (encouraging MNCs to recognize
codes of conduct that respect fundamental rights).
305. See, e.g., Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 570 (maintaining that lack of enforce-
ment is significant problem with codes of conduct); Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top?
International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMp. LAB. L. &
POL'YJ. 347, 354 (1999) (claiming that International Labour Organisation ("ILO") Tri-
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1. General Background
While some scholars have claimed that the only responsibil-
ity of a business is to use its resources to the fullest extent to raise
profits while staying within the bounds of the law,3 0 6 others ar-
gue that MNCs have increasing social obligations.30 7 Presently,
MNCs do not have many legal obligations with respect to the
countries in which they are operating.3 °8 Corporate regulations
are particularly necessary for MNCs operating in countries en-
gaged in civil war, since absence of rule of law often creates an
economic opportunity for MNCs that can be detrimental to the
partite Declaration is ineffective because it has no ability to sanction MNCs for non-
compliance).
306. See, e.g., Milton Freidman, Social Purpose of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 33 (stating that businesses need only concern them-
selves with making legal profit). Milton Friedman is a Nobel Prize winning economist.
See How Indexation Builds in Inflation, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 12, 1979, at 114, 114 (noting that
Milton Freidman won Nobel Prize).
307. See Stuart Rees & Shelley Wright, Human Rights and Business Controversies, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, CORPORATE REsPONSIBILITr. A DIALOGUE 3, 5-8 (2000) (explaining ne-
cessity of corporate observance of human rights standards); Wells, supra note 191, at 70
(claiming that proliferation of private and international codes of conduct reflect grow-
ing awareness that MNCs should not participate in business that implicates human
rights abuses); Douglass Cassel, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can Interna-
tional Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic Stability? Corporate Initiatives: A Second
Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1963, 1981-84 (1996) (suggesting
levels of corporate responsibility depending upon proximity of human rights violations
to corporate activity). See generally Anderson, supra note 248, at 468 (asserting that
MNCs should have legal duty to observe human rights). Commentators note that
MNCs have become increasingly influential as globalization continues into the twenty-
first century. See Clare Duffield, Multinational Corporations and Workers'Rights in HUMAN
RIGHTS, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: A DIALOGUE 191, 193-94 (Stuart Rees & Shelley
Wright eds., 2000) (examining power that MNCs have over developing nations); Duf-
field, supra note 17, at 22 (asserting that MNCs play increasing role in social policy);
Cassel, supra, at 1979-80 (claiming that annual revenues of MNCs often exceed that of
most nations); Kieserman, supra note 177, at 882-83 (stating that MNCs often exercise
more control over resources than governments); Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adju-
dication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REv.
1139, 1142-43 (1999) (noting dual impact MNCs can have on host countries by improv-
ing economy and simultaneously exploiting human rights).
308. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 84 (claiming that public international law im-
poses virtually no obligations on MNCs); Wells, supra note 191, at 65 (maintaining that
MNCs are not obliged under any controlling law at present); Sacharoff, supra note 179,
at 931 (asserting that MNCs are obliged to abide by laws of country in which they oper-
ate); Kieserman, supra note 177, at 881-83 (asserting that MNCs can operate with no
accountability in many countries); see also Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct
and the FITC: Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 608 (2000) (stating that traditionally MNCs suffer no consequences
when MNC fails to take action to prevent human rights abuses by government).
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local citizens who live in the instability. 309 In response to the
lack of regulation, there have been several attempts to design
codes for the protection of both foreign investment and host
countries.3 10
2. Approaches
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment ("OECD"), International Labour Organisation ("ILO"),
and the United Nations all have developed guidelines for MNCs
operating in countries other than their home country.31' The
U.S. government also has encouraged MNCs to observe certain
minimum standards in their operations abroad with respect to
fundamental rights. 312  Additionally, turbulent political situa-
tions in certain regions, such as South Africa and Northern Ire-
land, have given rise to private efforts to develop standards for
MNC activities in those areas.313
a. International Efforts
Recognizing the growing importance of international in-
vestment, the OECD developed their Declaration on Interna-
309. See Duffield, supra note 17, at 28 (examining opportunities for profit in cir-
cumstances of conflict); SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 19, at 12-13 (suggesting that certain
private companies may benefit from increased destabilization in conflict areas); see also
Collier, supra note 13 (theorizing that certain conditions make civil war profitable for
insurgents).
310. See OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 972-76 (establishing guidelines for
MNCs operating outside home country); Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164, at 425-28
(proposing labor standards for MNCs running facilities in nations other than country of
incorporation); Draft U.N. Code, supra note 164 (suggesting standards for corporations
with international operations); Model Principles, supra note 164 (urging MNCs to ad-
here to voluntary code of conduct respecting human rights); Sullivan Principles, supra
note 164, at 1496 (establishing principles for corporations operating in South Africa);
Irish National Caucus, supra note 164 (creating guidelines for MNCs with operations in
Northern Ireland). See generally Frey, supra note 168, at 154-60 (reviewing past efforts to
regulate MNCs by United Nations, governments, and NGOs).
311. See OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 972-76 (proposing guidelines for
MNC activity outside home country); Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164, at 425-28
(suggesting standards for MNC treatment of workers in facilities in nations other than
country of incorporation); Draft U.N. Code, supra note 164 (suggesting guidelines for
MNCs).
312. See Model Principles, supra note 164 (suggesting standards for MNCs with
respect to fundamental rights).
313. See Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (creating standards for MNCs
with operations in South Africa during apartheid); Irish National Caucus, supra note
164 (suggesting guidelines for MNCs with activities in Northern Ireland).
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tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises ("Declara-
tion")."' The ILO developed standards for MNC activities with
respect to treatment of workers in 1978.315 The United Nations
similarly has attempted to develop a code of conduct for MNCs,
but the General Assembly never adopted the proposed draft.316
i. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
In 1976, the OECD introduced their Declaration.317 This
Declaration calls on MNCs to respect the policy choices of the
nation in which they are operating, to provide any information
requested by national authorities while taking account of busi-
ness confidentiality, to work closely with local businesses and
communities, to refuse bribes in all circumstances, and to re-
frain from participation in political activities.31 These standards
are voluntary and unenforceable.3 19
ii. International Labour Organisation
The ILO developed international standards for MNCs with
the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multina-
tional Enterprises and Social Policy ("Tripartite Declaration"). 320
The Tripartite Declaration urges MNCs to create employment
opportunities in the countries where they operate, promote
314. See OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 967 (stating that OECD member
countries considered that "international investment has assumed increased importance
in the world economy").
315. See Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164, at 425-28 (proposing labor standards
for MNCs outside of home country).
316. See Draft U.N. Code, supra note 164 (suggesting standards for MNC activity in
countries other than country of incorporation); Anderson, supra note 248, at 475 (com-
menting that General Assembly never adopted Draft U.N. Code); Rice, supra note 216,
at 170 (observing that Draft U.N. Code has not gone into effect).
317. OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 969-70; see also Lance Compa & Tashia
Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Doing Business in China and Latin America: Developments in Com-
parative and International Labor Law: Enforcing International Labor Rights Through Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 670 (1995) (examining history of
OECD Declaration).
318. OECD Declaration, supra note 164, at 972 annex (1976).
319. Id. at 970; see also Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 85 (noting that OECD Declara-
tion is voluntary and unenforceable, and has not been invoked often); Compa & Hinch-
liffe-Darricarrere, supra note 317, at 671 (noting that OECD Declaration lacks coercive
enforcement); Hepple, supra note 305, at 354 (asserting that OECD Declaration was
developed by industrialized nations to avoid stricter codes and therefore, it is volun-
tary).
320. Tripartite Declaration, supra note 164.
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equality of opportunity, ensure stable employment, provide voca-
tion training in cooperation with national government, guaran-
tee favorable work conditions and workplace safety, and protect
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.
3 21
These standards, like the OECD Guidelines, are also voluntary
and they lack an enforcement mechanism. 22 Acknowledging
the deficiencies of the principles, the ILO initiated a new Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work ("Funda-
mental Principles") .12' At least one commentator claims that
since the Fundamental Principles are relatively new, their poten-
tial to ensure observance of human rights is still unclear.
3 24
iii. United Nations
More recently, the United Nations developed the United
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
("Draft U.N. Code") .325 The Draft U.N. Code makes explicit ref-
321. Id. at 425-28.
322. See Zia-Zarifi, supra note 25, at 85 (noting failure of ILO to establish binding
code of conduct for MNCs); Hepple, supra note 305, at 354 (maintaining that Tripartite
Declaration is ineffective because of absence of sanctions); Anderson, supra note 248, at
476 (observing that Tripartite Declaration is ineffective because it relies on public per-
suasion to ensure compliance); Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 317, at
671 (noting that enforcement of Tripartite Declaration is through discreet persuasion
and public embarrassment). The International Labour Organisation ("ILO") has failed
to implement its own principles with regard to MNCs. See, e.g., Press Release, Interna-
tional Labor Organization, Report of ILO Commission Reveals Widespread and System-
atic Use of Forced Labor in Myanmar (Burma), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/bureau/inf/pr/1998/32.htm (examining practice of forced labor in Myanmar
imposed by military authorities with no inquiry into involvement of relevant oil compa-
nies in region, particularly Unocal and Total SA).
323. See International Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/
ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm [hereinafter Fundamental Principles] (stating that all Member
States have obligation to respect fundamental rights, including freedom of association,
right against forced labor, right against child labor, and right against discrimination in
employment). The Declaration only imposes an obligation on Member States and not
on MNCs. See id.
324. See Fundamental Principles, supra note 323 (stating that Fundamental Princi-
ples were adopted in June 1998); Anderson, supra note 248, at 476 (observing that it is
too early to assess effectiveness of Fundamental Principles).
325. Draft U.N. Code, supra note 164; see also Sacharoff, supra note 179, at 933 (not-
ing that Draft U.N. Code proposed standards for treatment of MNCs by governments
and MNC conduct); Frey, supra note 168, at 166 (claiming that U.N. Economic and
Social Council established U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations in 1974
and that Commission's purpose was to develop code for MNC activity); Rice, supra note
216, at 169-70 (asserting that Draft U.N. Code is recognition that MNCs have certain
responsibilities when investing abroad). The United Nations also attempted to formu-
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erence to human rights and encourages MNCs to respect the
sovereignty of the nations in which they operate. 26 The U.N.
General Assembly never officially adopted the Draft U.N. Code
and, therefore, the code remains a hortatory document, with no
means of enforcement.3
27
b. United States Efforts
In May 1995, President Clinton revealed the Model Business
Principles121 ("Model Principles") .329 The Model Principles set
late a code of conduct for MNCs in the 1970s, but this effort was unsuccessful. See
Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 317, at 669 (observing that U.N. Code
developed in 1970s is not useful with advent of modern day globalization); Cassel, supra
note 307, at 1969 (stating that U.N. has attempted and failed to develop international
code of conduct for MNCs since 1970s). See generally Seymour Rubin, Transnational
Corporations and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between Interna-
tional Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1275
(1995) (examining history of U.N. effort to develop Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations); Anderson, supra note 248, at 474-76 (reviewing international attempts to
create codes of conduct for businesses operating in nations other than home country).
326. See Draft UN. Code, supra note 164, at para. 13 (stating that "transnational
corporations should/shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
countries in which they operate").
327. See Anderson, supra note 248, at 475 (noting that Draft U.N. Code was never
adopted by General Assembly); Rice, supra note 216, at 170 (observing that Draft U.N.
Code has not gone into effect). See generally Salbu, supra note 168, at 335-53 (analyzing
difficulties posed by international codes of conduct).
328. See Model Principles, supra note 164 (encouraging MNCs to adopt voluntary
codes of conduct in recognition of importance of upholding universal standards of
human rights).
329. See Paul Lewis, U.S. Provides First Details Of Its Business Ethics Code, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 1995, at 36 (reporting that Clinton administration disclosed plans in May 1995
to encourage MNCs to adopt voluntary code of conduct); Frey, supra note 168, at 172
(stating that President Clinton revealed Model Business Principles ("Model Principles")
in May 1995); Wells, supra note 191, at 66 (claiming that U.S. government released
Model Principles in May 1995). The Model Business Principles ("Model Principles")
responded to public pressure to link human rights and most favored nation status with
respect to China. See Cassel, supra note 307, at 1974-75 (asserting that when President
Clinton de-linked human rights from U.S. trade policy towards China, he promised to
emphasize corporate codes of conduct); Frey, supra note 168, at 171-72 (maintaining
that President Clinton vowed to establish human rights code for MNCs operating in
China); Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The
Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30
LAw & PoL'v INT'L Bus. 111, 125 (1998) (claiming that President Clinton proposed
Model Principles on account of promise made to establish code while reviewing China's
most favored nation status). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which holds
American MNCs liable for bribing foreign officials, is evidence of U.S. concern with
regulation of MNC activity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (1994). The For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act states, in part, that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person other than an issuer that is subject to
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standards for the treatment of workers and encourage a corpo-
rate atmosphere that values freedom of expression, condemns
political oppression, contributes to the local community, and
section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 USCS § 78dd-1] or a
domestic concern (as defined in section 104 of this Act [15 USCS § 78dd-2])
*.. while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any
other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization
of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization
of the giving of anything of value to-
(1) any foreign official for purposes of-
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in
violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper
advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such person in ob-
taining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;
or
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign
political office for purposes of-
I. (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in
its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to do
or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party, official, or
candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
II.(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence with
a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act
or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such per-
son in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person; or
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of
value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign
official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office, for purposes of-
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party,
party official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such
foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such foreign official, political party,
party official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
III.(C) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candi-
date to use his or its influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instru-
mentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2000). See generally A. Timothy Mar-
tin, Corruption and Improper Payments: Global Trends and Applicable Laws, 36 ALBERTA L.
REv. 416, 420-26 (1998) (explaining Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Gary Eisenberg,
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 Am. CiM. L. REv. 595 (2000) (examining Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and subsequent amendments).
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promotes ethical conduct.3"' The Model Principles are volun-
tary and non-binding. 331
c. Private Efforts
Another method of regulating MNCs is through self-im-
posed codes of conduct. 332 In response to public pressure, some
MNCs have individually adopted their own codes of conduct.333
These efforts vary in specificity and degree. 34 Corporations that
have recognized the value of corporate codes of conduct include
Levi Strauss, Nike, Gap, and Sears.335 Occasionally, where a par-
ticular nation has consistent human rights problems, companies
will adhere to industry-wide codes of conduct, such as the Sulli-




Reverend Leon Sullivan, a General Motors board member,
first initiated the concept of an industry-wide code of conduct in
330. Model Principles, supra note 164; see also Cassel, supra note 307, at 1974 (ex-
amining terms of Model Principles); Anderson, supra note 248, at 482-83 (detailing
provisions of Model Principles).
331. Model Principles, supra note 164.
332. See Cassel, supra note 307, at 1972 (asserting that many MNCs have responded
to human rights abuses by adopting private codes of conduct); Bloomfield, supra note
168, at 570-72 (examining various corporate motivations for voluntarily adopting codes
of conduct).
333. See Cassel, supra note 307, at 1972 (stating that corporations have responded
to human rights violations with codes of conduct for their operations); Frey, supra note
168, at 177-80 (explaining various types of codes of conduct adopted by MNCs to state
commitment to human rights). See generally Liubicic, supra note 328, at 128-31 (examin-
ing private initiatives to develop internal codes of conduct).
334. See Frey, supra note 168, at 177 (asserting that corporate codes of conduct can
be divided into three general types: vendor standards regarding forced or child labor,
standards supporting civil and political rights, and criteria for investment).
335. Cassel, supra note 307, at 1973; see also Frey, supra note 168, at 177 (claiming
that Sears, K-Mart, Reebok International Ltd., Walmart, and Timberland have all
adopted self-imposed standards for their overseas operations). See generally Compa &
Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supra note 317, at 675-86 (examining corporate codes of con-
duct adopted by Levi-Strauss, Reebok, and Starbucks). One commentator argues that
the Federal Trade Commission should hold MNCs accountable for violations of these
self-imposed codes through regulations controlling deceptive advertising. Lu, supra
note 308, at 617-24.
336. See Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (creating standards for MNCs
operating in South Africa during apartheid era); Irish National Caucus, supra note 164
(developing guidelines for MNCs with operations in Northern Ireland to fight religious
discrimination).
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response to the public outcry against apartheid in South Africa
in the 1970s and 1980s.33 7 Reverend Sullivan created the Sulli-
van Principles, establishing standards of corporate responsibility
for MNCs operating in South Africa." 8 The Sullivan Principles
not only called for the eradication of discrimination in the work-
place, but also required MNCs to use their influence to work for
the end of apartheid.339 The MNCs that signed on to the Sulli-
van Principles also agreed to external audits and public reports
to guarantee compliance.3 40  Although the Sullivan Principles
cannot claim to have caused the demise of apartheid, they
served as a basic model for other codes of conduct aimed at cor-
porate responsibility. 341
337. See Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 587 (asserting that General Motors' refusal
to withdraw from South Africa led Sullivan to develop Sullivan Principles and explain-
ing history of Sullivan Principles); Sacharoff, supra note 179, at 935 (claiming that Sulli-
van was first to develop framework for corporate code of conduct); Cassel, supra note
307, at 1969 (noting that Sullivan Principles were experimental in 1970s and 1980s).
338. Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496; see also Cassel, supra note 307, at
1969 (noting that signatories to Sullivan Principles, through their commitment to Sulli-
van Principles, took unprecedented step towards corporate social responsibility for
human rights abuses); Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 587 (maintaining that goal of
Sullivan Principles was to end apartheid and have significant impact on lives of blacks in
South Africa); Anderson, supra note 248, at 476-77 (asserting that Sullivan hoped that
companies refusing to withdraw from South Africa would at least contribute to demise
of apartheid).
339. See Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (stating that "[e]ach signator of
the Statement of Principles will proceed immediately to: [e]valuate existing and/or
develop programs, as appropriate, to address the specific needs of Black and other non-
white employees in the areas of housing, health care, transportation and recreation");
see also Liubicic, supra note 328, at 122-23 (explaining that Sullivan Principles required
non-discrimination in workplace as well as efforts to improve housing, education, and
health facilities).
340. See Sullivan Principles, supra note 164, at 1496 (stating that signatories will
"[rieport progress on an annual basis to Reverend Sullivan through the independent
administrative unit he has established [and] [h]ave all areas specified by Reverend Sul-
livan audited by a certified public accounting firm"); see also Frey, supra note 168, at 175
(reporting that D. Reid Weedon, of Arthur D. Little consulting firm, conducted audits
and graded companies that signed on to Sullivan Principles). Initially, only 12 corpora-
tions chose to sign on to the Sullivan Principles, but by 1982, the Sullivan Principles
claimed about 150 signatories. Anderson, supra note 248, at 478; Liubicic, supra note
328, at 123; see also Frey, supra note 168, at 175 (claiming that Sullivan Principles, at
their height, had 125 signatories).
341. See Sacharoff, supra note 179, at 936 (asserting that Sullivan Principles did not
end apartheid but basic principles endured and many attempts have been made to
replicate Sullivan Principles); Frey, supra note 168, at 175 (noting that Sullivan Princi-
ples were not enough to eradicate apartheid); Liubicic, supra note 328, at 123-24
(claiming that despite failure to end apartheid, Sullivan Principles had significant posi-
tive effect South African blacks). Sullivan considered the Sullivan Principles a failure
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ii. MacBride Principles
The MacBride Principles address the corporate responsibili-
ties of U.S. MNCs in Northern Ireland. 42 Named after Dr. Sean
MacBride, an Irish nationalist and the founder of Amnesty Inter-
national,3 43 these principles attempt to ensure non-discrimina-
tion in employment and oblige MNCs to protect the safety of
their workers not only at work, but also during their commute to
and from work. 4 4 In February 1995, the MacBride Principles
had thirty-two MNC signatories out of the eighty U.S. MNCs op-
erating in Northern Ireland.345
3. Lack of Legal Enforcement as Criticism to Corporate Codes
of Conduct
Codes of conduct often fail to be effective because they are
not enforced. 346 Past international efforts have proven ineffec-
tive because they lack power to punish those who do not com-
ply.347 Commentators also criticize Clinton's Model Principles as
because they did not succeed in the destruction of apartheid. See Patricia Arnold &
Theresa Hammond, The Role of Accounting in Ideological Conflict: Lessons from the South
African Divestment Movement, 19 Accr., ORG., & Soc. 111, 117-18 (1994) (reporting that
Sullivan withdrew his support for Sullivan Principles after it was clear that apartheid
had not been dismantled).
342. See Irish National Caucus, supra note 164 (encouraging non-discriminatory
U.S. MNC investment in Northern Ireland); Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 688
(describing nine MacBride Principles); Liubicic, supra note 328, at 124 (claiming gen-
eral goal of MacBride Principles was to eliminate discrimination against Catholic work-
ers). See generally Conor O'Clery, MacBride Principles Report Claims Some Success, IRISH
TIMES, July 2, 1993, at 6 (describing MacBride Principles).
343. See Frey, supra note 168, at 175 (stating that MacBride Principles were named
after Dr. Sean MacBride, who founded Amnesty International and was Irish national-
ist).
344. See Irish National Caucus, supra note 164 (urging MNCs to increase represen-
tation of religious minorities in workforce, to prohibit religious symbols in workplace,
and to ban discriminatory hiring and firing practices). The MacBride Principles also
require MNCs to guarantee the safety of workers at work and during their commute.
Id.
345. Cassel, supra note 307, at 1972. Commentators claim that forty percent of
U.S. MNCs operating in Northern Ireland have subscribed to MacBride Principles.
Liubicic, supra note 328, at 124; Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 588.
346. See Bloomfield, supra note 168, at 570 (asserting that most pressing problem
with codes of conduct is lack of enforcement); Hepple, supra note 305, at 354 (criticiz-
ing ILO Tripartite Declaration as ineffective because it has no mechanism for imposing
sanctions for non-compliance); Liubicic, supra note 328, at 136-37 (claiming that inter-
nal corporate monitors of private codes of conduct have minimal incentive to report
violations of code).
347. See Salbu, supra note 168, at 341-42 (criticizing Draft U.N. Code and OECD's
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being vague and inadequate because they are voluntary and un-
enforceable.348 Additionally, private initiatives are often self-im-
posed, making it difficult to assess whether a corporation is actu-
ally complying with its own code. 49
III. DE BEERS'S LIABILITY UNDER THE ATCA
As governments and the United Nations seek permanent so-
lutions to end these civil wars,350 attempts will be made to re-
build these societies. In this century, countries have addressed
war crimes by setting up tribunals to hold the perpetrators ac-
countable.15 1  Still, these tribunals suffer from multiple
problems, inhibiting their overall effectiveness. 3 52
There is no court of human rights in Africa and national
courts are not likely to provide a fair forum for the victim.
353
Declaration as lacking enough specificity to be effectively enforced); Hepple, supra note
305, at 354 (claiming that lack of enforcement ability caused ILO Tripartite Declaration
to fail).
348. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Corporations and Human Rights, available at
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/initiatives/corp.html (claiming that U.S. government
failed to implement Model Principles); see also Anderson, supra note 248, at 483 (noting
that both human rights advocates and business leaders have criticized Model Princi-
ples); Sacharoff, supra note 179, at 935 (reporting that human rights groups disapprove
of Model Principles because they are vague and unable to effectively target human
rights abuses); Frey, supra note 168, at 172-73 (observing that human rights community
criticized Model Principles as being vague, duplicative, and unenforceable). U.S. busi-
ness leaders also criticized the Model Principles for putting U.S. MNCs at a comparable
disadvantage with competitors. See Frey, supra note 168, at 173 (claiming that business
community did not welcome Model Principles because they would have effect of plac-
ing U.S. MNCs at disadvantage compared to competitors); Sacharoff, supra note 179, at
935 (maintaining that business leaders advocated for multilateral approach that would
provide more protection to MNCs from competitive disadvantage that Model Principles
may create for U.S. MNCs).
349. See Lu, supra note 308, at 616 (noting that self imposed codes of conduct
present problems of disclosure); Hepple, supra note 305, at 359 (asserting that many
companies do not adequately monitor compliance with their own private codes of con-
duct); Liubicic, supra note 328, at 136-37 (criticizing internal corporate monitoring be-
cause corporate monitors may be hesitant to publicize violations); see also U.N. Final
Report, supra note 15, at para. 199 (acknowledging that it is difficult to validate whether
De Beers is complying with its pledge not to buy conflict diamonds).
350. See supra notes 88-90, 119, and 123-124 and accompanying text (explaining
U.N. Security Council sanctions on trade in diamonds and arms with Angola and Sierra
Leone and noting that U.N. is in process of establishing war tribunal for Sierra Leone).
351. See supra notes 169 and 235 and accompanying text (following establishment
of various war crimes tribunals).
352. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (noting that commentators observe
many obstacles in effectiveness of tribunals).
353. See id. (observing that no court of human rights exists in Africa).
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The ATCA provides an alternative method for victims of human
rights abuses to hold their violators accountable. 54 Therefore,
plaintiffs may seek redress in American courts under the
ATCA.355
Although a cause of action against the insurgent groups
may seem logical, these groups may be unavailable for suit.
356
Thus, plaintiffs may institute a suit against De Beers for its in-
volvement in the trade in conflict diamonds. The plaintiffs will
assert that De Beers knowingly funded war crimes and crimes
against humanity.3 7 Since complicity in war crimes and crimes
against humanity are possible violations of the "law of na-
tions,"35 and the plaintiffs are likely to be aliens, the ATCA pro-
vides a cause of action for these plaintiffs in U.S. court.
De Beers will likely object to a suit in U.S. court, claiming
forum non conveniens and that the court does not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over the company. Given the recent trend of
forum non conveniens motions in ATCA cases, 35 9 the court will
probably not accept this objection. Angola and Sierra Leone do
not provide adequate forums for these claims.360 Furthermore,
South Africa, De Beers's headquarters, does not present an ap-
propriate forum because of the burden it imposes on plaintiffs,
who probably do not reside in South Africa.3 61 Courts also have
recognized that the United States has an interest in adjudicating
354. See supra notes 169-245 and accompanying text (examining history of ATCA
and ATCA cases that have attempted to hold perpetrators liable for human rights
abuses).
355. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining that lack of options for
alien plaintiffs may lead to utilization of ATCA as possible means of recovery).
356. See, e.g., supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting that Lom6 Peace
Agreement granted amnesty to RUF insurgent fighters).
357. See supra notes 153-55 and 160 and accompanying text (observing that com-
mentators claim that De Beers bought diamonds from UNITA forces and speculate that
De Beers also acquired diamonds from conflict areas in Sierra Leone).
358. See supra notes 237-39 and 242 and accompanying text (quoting Nuremberg
Principles and asserting that complicity in war crimes violates international law).
359. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (noting that forum non conveniens
is common objection to ATCA suits).
360. See supra notes 84 and 117 and accompanying text (discussing that violence
continues in both Angola and Sierra Leone).
361. See supra notes 259 and 266 and accompanying text (stating that forum non
conveniens is appropriate where claim can be pursued more fairly and effectively in
another nation).
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human rights claims.362 Thus, De Beers will probably not suc-
ceed on a forum non conveniens motion.
Although De Beers is not a U.S. corporation, a court may be
able to exercise jurisdiction over the company. Applying the
minimum contacts test to De Beers, the plaintiff must establish
that De Beers has a high degree of contact with the United
States and that the claim is sufficiently related to those con-
tacts.363 De Beers is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction simply be-
cause its diamonds reach the U.S. market.36 4 Nevertheless, De
Beers's contacts may be established by examining whether De
Beers's advertising campaign in the U.S. shows that the company
can reasonably expect to be hailed into U.S. court and whether
these contacts rise to the level of "continuous and systematic. "365
The second part of the test requires that the claim be re-
lated to the contacts.36 6 In this situation, the claim revolves
around illicit diamonds that De Beers bought from insurgent
groups and then marketed to U.S. customers, amongst others.
De Beers's advertising campaign in the United States is inher-
ently related to the diamonds that De Beers buys and sells.
To recover under the ATCA against De Beers, the potential
plaintiffs must establish that the MNC committed a violation of
the "law of nations."367 First, the Nuremberg Principles establish
that complicity in war crimes violates international law.368 The
case against Frederick Flick confirms that knowingly profiting off
of war crimes and accepting looted property from known war
criminals violates international law.369 The Holocaust plaintiffs
362. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text (claiming that TPVA reflects
U.S. policy interest in adjudicating human rights claims).
363. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdiction
and minimum contacts test).
364. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (observing that Asahi court claimed
that personal jurisdiction was inappropriate when company simply placed product in
stream of commerce).
365. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text (noting that advertising in fo-
rum state may give rise to jurisdiction and explaining that continuous and systematic
contacts also justify jurisdiction).
366. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (commenting that jurisdiction de-
pends on extent of contacts as well as relatedness of contacts).
367. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (examining "law of nations").
368. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (quoting Nuremberg Principle VII
and noting that complicity in war crimes violates international law).
369. See supra notes 24042 and accompanying text (describing conviction of Fred-
erick Flick at Nuremberg Tribunal).
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also rely on this theory of liability, amongst other theories, in
their suit against the Swiss banks.3 °
De Beers's policy of buying and controlling all of the
diamonds on the market means that they buy both official, legal
diamonds and illicit diamonds from the black market. 7 1 Given
De Beers's history of trading with smugglers, it seems likely that
De Beers bought diamonds smuggled out of Angola and Sierra
Leone by insurgent groups. 372 This trade provided the insurgent
groups with the money to continue their wars, subjecting the ci-
vilian populations to human rights violations. 7 ' De Beers's pol-
icy of valuing profits and control of the diamond market above
all else allowed these terrible crimes to happen in a systematic
fashion.
War crimes are included amongst universal offenses, which
are punishable anywhere. 74 Although complicity in committing
war crimes violates international law,375 this offense is not a uni-
versal offense according to the Restatement. 76 Additionally,
complicity to commit war crimes suggests that the plaintiff must
show a connection between the war criminals and the entity act-
ing in complicity. The test for complicity may be similar in con-
struction to the joint action test for State action.3 7 7
Plaintiffs will encounter difficulties in showing a substantial
connection between De Beers and the insurgent groups because
370. See supra notes 229, 234, and 243 and accompanying text (noting that Holo-
caust plaintiffs use Nuremberg Principles and Flick conviction to claim that Swiss banks
should be liable for knowingly profiting off of slave labor and looted property).
371. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing De Beers's former
policy of controlling both supply and demand acquiring majority of diamonds before
diamonds reach consumer market).
372. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text (remarking that De Beers has
traded with smugglers from Angola and Sierra Leone in past in effort to maintain con-
trol of diamond market).
373. See supra notes 15-7 and accompanying text (discussing trade of diamonds for
weapons and describing human rights violations by insurgent groups).
374. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (noting that war crimes are
universal offense and explaining that all states have jurisdiction over universal of-
fenses).
375. See supra note 238-39 and accompanying text (quoting Nuremberg Principle
VII, defining complicity in war crimes as violating international law and commenting
that Nuremberg Principles are accepted as part of international law).
376. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (observing that complicity in war
crimes is not among crimes included as universal offenses).
377. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (claiming that State action requires
significant cooperation between State and private entity).
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of De Beers's use of multiple middlemen in the acquisition of its
diamonds.3 78 De Beers has dealt with smugglers in the past, par-
ticularly where the black market proved more profitable than
official trade routes.179 Due to the lack of transparency in De
Beers's operations and the diamond industry as a whole ,380 it is
difficult to ascertain exactly how much the company knew about
the diamonds it acquired. Although many inferences can be
drawn about De Beers's participation in the conflict diamond
trade, it is doubtful that a plaintiff will establish the requisite de-
gree of proof necessary to show complicity between De Beers
and the insurgent groups. Additionally, since plaintiffs will likely
fail to allege the necessary facts to show complicity, a court may
dismiss a claim against De Beers on a 12(b) (6) motion for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 81
Given the increasing influence of MNCs, many commenta-
tors claim that MNCs should observe international human rights
standards.382 Efforts by international organizations to regulate
MNCs have been ineffective, as have government initiatives.383
The voluntary nature of these principles and codes is their fatal
flaw.38 4 Therefore, these initiatives need legally binding force.
The ATCA is a potentially useful tool for preventing human
rights abuses by MNCs, but in its present form, the ATCA
presents many obstacles for plaintiffs to overcome. 83 As of yet,
378. See supra notes 148 and accompanying text (describing De Beers's outside
market buying process and remarking that multiple intermediaries create problems in
tracing origin of diamonds).
379. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (asserting that De Beers traded
with smugglers in past to maintain control of diamond supply).
380. See supra notes 47 and 137 and accompanying text (discussing that diamond
industry and De Beers lack transparency).
381. See supra notes 253-55 and 257 and accompanying text (explaining that courts
generally set high factual threshold for ATCA plaintiffs and are likely to dismiss on
12(b) (6) grounds for failure to meet this threshold requirement).
382. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (citing commentators who claim
that MNCs should be required to observe human rights standards).
383. See supra notes 253-01 and accompanying text (discussing issues that prevent
recovery under ATCA such as high factual threshold, forum non conveniens, lack of
personal jurisdiction, and requirement of State action).
384. See supra notes 203-28 and accompanying text (explaining facts and unsuc-
cessful outcomes for plaintiffs in Beanal and Unocal).
385. See supra notes 319, 322, 327, and 331 and accompanying text (observing that
codes of conduct developed by international organizations, United Nations, and U.S.
government are non-binding and ineffective).
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no ATCA case against an MNC has been successful.3" 6 The
ATCA should be re-examined and amended to reach the con-
duct of MNCs.
Commentators have recognized the limitations of the ATCA
and have suggested that new federal legislation called the For-
eign Human Rights Abuse Act should be adopted."8 7 This pro-
posed legislation should prohibit MNCs from engaging in prac-
tices that cause or facilitate human rights abuses, including com-
plicity in war crimes by funding war criminals. The legislation
should call on the U.S. government to develop standards that
MNCs can use as guidelines in achieving compliance with the
new legislation. Violation of the proposed law should give rise to
civil and criminal liability. Amending the ATCA in this way to
target MNCs will assist aggrieved individuals bringing suit in U.S.
court and hold MNCs to higher standards of accountability.
CONCLUSION
Imposing liability on MNCs for knowingly profiting off of
human rights abuses will deter MNCs from these unethical prac-
tices and encourage states to be more observant of human
rights. If states know that they will not attract foreign investment
with a bad human rights record, perhaps they will make con-
certed efforts to improve their practices. Furthermore, MNCs
will be forced to take account of human rights when considering
its business choices.
The trade in conflict diamonds can be stopped, and could
have been stopped years ago if De Beers had decided that
human life was more important than profits. The threat of liti-
gation would have made De Beers contemplate the results
before engaging in this trade. Amending the ATCA and adopt-
ing more comprehensive legislation will make this threat a real
possibility, thereby forcing MNCs to carefully consider the lives
at stake in their business choices.
386. See id. (noting that codes of conduct are often voluntary); see also supra note
346 and accompanying text (claiming that unenforceable nature of codes of conduct is
large problem).
387. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legislation for
holding MNCs liable for human rights abuses).
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